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 ABSTRACT 
This paper anticipates the 2012 revision of the European Insolvency Regulation, 
which is the sole Union legislation on the subject of cross border insolvency 
proceedings. 
 The paper first describes the historical background of the Regulation. The salient 
point of the historical discussion is that the Regulation is the product of forty years 
of negotiation and arises from a historical context that is no longer applicable to 
current economic realities, i.e. it provides for liquidation, not reorganization, it 
doesn’t deal with cross border groups of companies, and it lacks an effective 
mechanism for transparency and creditor participation. 
The paper then reviews the unique hybrid jurisdictional system of concurrent 
universal and territorial proceedings that the Regulation imposes. It looks at this 
scheme from a practical viewpoint, i.e. what issues arise with concurrent 
proceedings in two states, involving the same assets, the same creditors, and the 
same company.  
The paper then focuses on a significant issue raised by the European Court of Justice 
in the Eurofoods case, i.e. the need to comply with fundamental due process 
principles that, while not articulated in the Regulation, lie at the core of Union law. 
Specifically, the paper considers the ramifications of the Court’s holding that “a 
Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another 
Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant 
breach of the fundamental right to be heard.” 
In response to the Court’s direction, this paper proposes a package of due process 
rights, consisting principally of an accessible, efficient and useful insolvency 
database, the infrastructure of which already exists, but the content and use of 
which has not yet been developed. As part of a cohesive three part due process 
package, the paper also proposes the formation of cross border creditors' 
committees and the establishment of a European Insolvency Administrator.  
Finally, on the institutional level, this paper proposes that the revision of the 
Regulation and the development of the insolvency database not only need to be 
coordinated, but need to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken, not as the 
separate efforts of diverse institutions, but as a single, unified endeavor.  
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Alan Stomel has been an attorney specializing in insolvency for twenty--five years. He 
began his career as an intern at the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the United 
States Trustee and has worked at major international law firms before starting his 
own firm in 1999. He has participated in the reorganization of more than fifty 
companies under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and has participated in the 
liquidation of hundreds more. He is quoted in the U.S. Congressional Record as an 
expert in the bankruptcy of firearms manufacturers and appears prominently in the 
book Lawyers, Guns and Money, an expose' of the cheap handgun industry in the 
United States. He received his J.D. degree from Loyola Law School in 1986 and his 
LL.M. (magna cum laude) in European and International Law from Vrije Universiteit 
Brusssel in 2011. Currently, he is a Legal Advisor at the European Commission, 
Justice Directorate 
 
 Table of Contents 
Introduction............................................................................................................. 9 
1 History Of The Regulation ................................................................................ 11 
1.1 Why The History Of The Regulation Is Crucial To Its Evaluation Today ........... 11 
1.2 The Chronology ............................................................................................ 11 
1.3 Universalism As The Foundational Model For The Regulation ........................ 12 
2 Harmonization ................................................................................................. 18 
3 The Jurisdictional Mechanism Of The Regulation: Comi, Forum Shopping And 
Corporate Groups – How The Regulation Works (And How It Doesn’t) ............... 21 
3.1 The Fundamental Jurisdictional Provisions Of The Regulation ........................ 21 
3.2 The Comi Question As A Due Process Issue ................................................... 22 
3.3 Forum Shopping............................................................................................ 25 
3.4 Corporate Groups.......................................................................................... 28 
3.5 The Problem With Concurrent Proceedings .................................................... 30 
3.6 The Regulation In Action- How Liquidators Comply With The Regulation’s 
Mandatory Duty Of Cooperation .................................................................... 31 
4 The Existing Notice Provisions Of The Regulation ............................................. 36 
4.1.1 Notice And Logistical Issues In Distribution Of Proceeds In Concurrent 
Proceedings................................................................................................ 39 
5 The Insolvency Database .................................................................................. 41 
5.1 The Calls For An Insolvency Database............................................................ 41 
5.2 What Insolvency Databases Are Operational At This Time?............................. 42 
5.3 Moving Forward Step By Step Based On Existing Technology And Due Process 
Requirements- A Proposal For A Three Part Due Process Package .................. 46 
Conclusion............................................................................................................. 50 
	  
 
 
IES Working Paper 3/2011 
9 
Introduction 
In the midst of the greatest financial crisis the world has seen since the Great 
Depression, at a time when bank bailouts, country bailouts, austerity measures, and 
stress tests are part of European daily news, the entire field of cross-border 
European business insolvency is regulated by a single twenty-two page document, 
conceived at a time before cross border subsidiaries and branches were the common 
method of conducting business, before anybody had heard of a debtor in 
possession, and when liquidation was the only type of insolvency proceeding, just as 
it had been since the first bench was broken in the plaza de San Marco almost five 
hundred years ago. 
This is not to say that a single document cannot establish principles that inspire a 
coherent and functioning legal regime. The European Insolvency Regulation 
(hereinafter, the “Regulation”) however, does not do that. It is a starting point, a first 
step, revolutionary in its scheme of modified universal jurisdiction, an experiment in 
supranational insolvency regulation that had never been attempted. Whether that 
was a result of political compromise or an intentional approach is a matter of debate 
as seen later in this paper. But the legislative history and the contemporaneous 
documents from the EU institutions demonstrate that it was always meant to be an 
experiment, not a permanent solution.1 
The ten year period since the Regulation came into effect has provided the 
opportunity to see it in action, to allow professionals the opportunity to test it out, 
for companies to utilize it, for courts to rule, and for academics to study it in all of 
its aspects. But it is now time for the next step. The deadline to report the results of 
the experiment, coming at a time of great financial crises, is timely. The purpose of 
this paper is to move the process forward, to present concrete proposals, to move 
toward the implementation that the current financial milieu demands. 
This paper is not a critical analysis of the Regulation. The Regulation has already 
been the subject of extensive and comprehensive critical analysis, the overwhelming 
focus of which is the “center of main interest” standard, corporate groups, and 
harmonization. These matters have been discussed extensively in literally thousands 
of articles, including books and articles by leading world experts on international 
insolvency. Nor is this a comparative law or conflict of laws study or a statistical 
analysis of insolvency proceedings, all of which has been done repeatedly. Although 
these matters will be touched on as background and context, this paper is much 
narrower in scope and from a different vantage point. This is a view from the inside, 
based on extensive meetings and communications with almost everyone at the 
European Union institutions involved in the insolvency area. It is also a product of a 
                                                
1 Article 46 of the Regulation provides: “No later than 1 June 2012, and every five years thereafter, the 
Commission shall present to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social 
Committee a report on the application of this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if need be 
by a proposal for adaptation of this Regulation.” 
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specific time and place, the period immediately prior to the revision of the 
Regulation in Brussels.  
The first half of this paper will establish a foundation and will attempt to present in 
an orderly fashion the history, the essential provisions of the Regulation and how 
they function, the major issues and pending debates. Although these areas are well 
known to those who operate in the insolvency area, their presentation is essential, 
because the solutions tend to suggest themselves. The paper will discuss the 
revolutionary hybrid jurisdictional approach of the Regulation and how this approach 
was premised on certain procedural prerequisites which were merely mentioned in 
passing in the Regulation, but never made explicit. Ultimately, however, and as 
evidenced in practice, there is a disconnect in the Regulation between law and 
procedure. The problematic result becomes evident in the discussion and in the case 
law.  
In the second half, the goal of this paper is to refocus the discourse, to redirect it to 
where it should be, on fundamental rights, on the right to fair trial and the right to 
notice and opportunity to be heard, to further identify the lack of those rights in the 
application of the Regulation, and then to suggest a minimal procedural solution 
consistent with the goals and values which are fundamental to EU law. This thesis 
will propose nothing revolutionary or inconsistent with what is in the Regulation or 
the rulings of the European Court of Justice regarding the Regulation. Instead, it will 
simply offer a more explicit statement of the procedural mechanisms that the 
experience of the last ten years has shown need to be explicit. In other words, it will 
show that without immediate and complete notice and access to information on a 
cross border basis, through a transparent and user friendly insolvency database, and 
through a system to administer and monitor and ensure the flow of information to 
all parties, the Regulation cannot function. 
IES Working Paper 3/2011 
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1 History of the Regulation 
1.1 Why the history of the regulation is crucial to its evaluation today 
The Regulation came into effect on May 31, 2002, but it was born out of a long and 
conflicted process during the last forty years of the 20th century. The Regulation 
was conceived in a world different than today and reflects those times, before cross 
border enterprises were the norm, before the incredible increase in the complexity 
of corporate or enterprise groups, before mega bankruptcies, debtors in possession, 
at a time when the only insolvency proceeding was a simple liquidation. It was a 
different world, commercially, technologically, legally, globally.  
That history is not mentioned here merely for academic interest, since that is not the 
focus of this paper and the history has been dealt with extensively in many articles 
and books. It is mentioned here because it is crucial for the understanding of the 
Regulation’s features and its weaknesses. A historical background is necessary to 
provide a context, a substratum. From that context, the issues and problems 
become evident, and the necessary solutions become obvious and entirely logical. 
But they don’t appear without a foundation which follows. 
1.2 The Chronology 
The salient facts relevant to the history of the Regulation are summarized in the 
Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, by Miguel Virgos and Etienne 
Schmit, (hereinafter, the “Virgos Schmit report”).2 According to the Virgos Schmit 
Report, the process began in 1963 with a committee of experts under the auspices 
of the Commission of the European Communities. Between 1963 and 1980 they 
drafted two Conventions, neither of which was approved. The second convention 
“was studied by an EC Council Working Party from 1982 until 1985, when work was 
suspended for lack of sufficient consensus.”  
In 1981, the Council of Europe drafted a proposed convention entitled “European 
Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy”, which was signed in 
Istanbul in 1990 (the “Istanbul Convention”). While never ratified, Paul J. Omar, in his 
in-depth analysis of the Convention, points out how this parallel process was the 
impetus for the resumption of work by the European Community,3 which led to the 
1995 EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings. That Convention also failed to be 
ratified because of bad timing, occurring at the same time as two major political 
crises involving the UK, fallout from mad cow disease and a flare-up between UK and 
Spain over Gibraltar.4 ` 
                                                
2 6500/96 Brussels, 3 May 1996. See pages 7-8. 
3 European Insolvency Law, Paul J. Omar, 2004, Ashgate Publishing Lmited, England at p. 72. See 
also Omar, Paul J. (2003) "The European Insolvency Regulation 2000: A Paradigm of International 
Insolvency Cooperation," Bond Law Review: Vol. 15: Issue 1, Article 10. Available at: 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol15/iss1/10 
4 European Union Regulation On Insolvency Proceedings, An Introductory Analysis (October 2006), 
Prof. Bob Wessels, at page 6. See www.bobwessels.nl 
Available at http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session 5/European Union 
Regulation on Insolvency 
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Even though the 1995 Convention was a victim of the political fallout, it did 
eventually become the Regulation, when the gauntlet was picked up by Germany and 
Finland with the publication of the August 1999 initiative which was later adopted in 
substantially the same form as the Regulation.5  
1.3 Universalism as the foundational model for the Regulation 
The initial rejection of the territorial approach 
From the very beginning of the forty year process, a dispute arose regarding what is 
now the fundamental feature of the Regulation. The Virgos Schmit Report [p. 7] 
indicates that the draft Convention provided for single proceedings with universal 
effect and rejected the idea of secondary territorial proceedings. That dispute 
persisted through the various drafts. The contemporaneous Report on the 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995 6 provides that: 
“whereas a committee of experts in the Commission of the European Communities 
drew up a first draft Convention from 1963 to 1980 and - after the enlargement of 
the Community beginning in 1973 - a second draft Convention, which provided for a 
single procedure to be recognised in the other Contracting States and precluded the 
simultaneous opening of domestic proceedings in these other States.”  
The fact that the opening of secondary territorial proceedings was specifically 
rejected at various stages and only seems to have reappeared with the 1999 
German/Finnish initiative (although that is less than clear from the available 
documentary evidence) is highly relevant and merits further scrutiny. What were the 
specific events or analysis that resulted in the decision to include secondary 
territorial proceedings? Was this a deliberate decision to adopt a modified 
universal/territorial approach or was this a happenstance occurrence due to last 
minute political manoeuvring? The answer is highly relevant to the analysis of the 
future viability of the modified territoriality/universality approach of the Regulation 
discussed below.  
Universalism versus Territoriality: What does it mean in the insolvency context? 
Prior to reviewing how the dialectic developed over time and how it continues today, 
it is helpful to see how universality and territoriality actually operate in the context 
of insolvency proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                       
The history leading to the adoption of the regulation and its predecessors are discussed in great detail in 
European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, by Jona Israel, Intersentia, 2005, Antwerpen-Oxford at 
p. 215 and onward. 
5 Per Israel, p. 243, “the Regulation is nearly identical in substance to the 1995 Convention,” referring 
to the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 1995. The 1999 Initiative is document number 1999/C 
221/06, “Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Finland with a view to the 
adoption of a Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings, submitted to the Council on 26 May 
1999” 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1999:221:0008:0023:EN:PDF] 
6Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995,  Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Rapporteur: Kurt Malangré, 23 April 1999, A4-0234/99; available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A4-1999-
0234&format=XML&language=EN  
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Universal insolvency jurisdiction means that all the assets of an entity are 
administered in a single insolvency proceeding, by one court, using one set of rules, 
with all members of a class of creditors treated equally according to the applicable 
priority scheme. Its advantages are uniformity, predictability, and equality of 
treatment. It allows for the pooling of all assets, for all assets to be administered 
together, for a sale as a going concern, and for the realization of a higher asset 
value than would be obtained in a piecemeal sale. It minimizes expenses, minimizes 
conflicts of law, and promotes economic efficiency. 
Universal proceedings need a single law in order to work because generally, and with 
certain key exceptions, one court cannot apply different laws to similarly situated 
parties at the same time in the same case. Universal proceedings therefore require 
procedural harmonization and at least a minimal level of substantive harmonization. 
In the continuum of insolvency regimes, the universalist and harmonized system is 
exemplified by the United States, where federal bankruptcy law is identical in all 
states and one court has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy estate which comprises all 
assets, wherever located. This is at one extreme of the spectrum.  
At the other end of the spectrum is the territorial model, in which a local or domestic 
court with jurisdiction only over domestic assets administers an insolvency 
proceeding involving an entity or establishment in its jurisdiction. When applied to 
cross border enterprises, the territorial model precludes the possibility of a joint 
reorganization and favours a piecemeal liquidation.  
Because universalism and harmonization go hand in hand, it is no surprise that the 
vocal arch foe of insolvency universalism, Professor LoPucki, would assert that: 
“Harmonization is a euphemism for forcing commercially less important countries to 
adopt the remedies and priorities of the commercially more important countries.” 7 
The quote, however, reflects an American centered viewpoint which does not take 
into account the much more complex harmonization debate in the European Union, 
where the tension between harmonization and state sovereignty not only has a long 
and dynamic history, but is part of everyday discourse. In the European Union 
context, where Member States are able to assert sovereignty rights through the 
European Council, the “commercially important countries” have not forced 
harmonization of insolvency laws. In fact, the opposite has proven to be the case, 
because Member States, strong or weak, are inclined to maintain their sovereignty 
and keep their own system of insolvency law.  
Therein lays the basis and inspiration of the hybrid system embodied in the 
Regulation. The Virgos Schmit Report, p. 13 provides:  
“The idea of a single exclusive universal form of insolvency proceedings for the 
whole of the  Community is difficult to implement without modifying, by the 
application of the law of the  State of the opening of proceedings, pre-existing rights 
created before insolvency under the different national laws of other Contracting 
States. The reason for this lies in the absence of a uniform system of security rights 
in Europe, and in the great diversity of national insolvency  laws as regards criteria 
                                                
7 Lynn M. Lopucki, Global And Out Of Control 2005, University of California, Los Angeles School of 
Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series 
Research Paper No. 05-8 at p. 19.  Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693601 
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for the priority to be given to the different classes of creditors. In this legal context, 
the Convention seeks to reconcile the advantages of the principle of universality and 
the necessary protection of local interests. This explains why a combined model has 
been adopted which permits local proceedings to coexist with the main universal 
proceedings.”  
This quote is critical to understanding the fundamental basis of the hybrid system, 
the belief that two factors, a Member State's unique security rights and its unique 
prioritization among creditors, can only be protected in territorial proceedings, and 
cannot be given up in favor of a harmonized system. This rationale is explicitly 
repeated in Recital 11 of the Regulation.  
The Territoriality Rationale 
Since this is the casus rationale of the hybrid system, the statement merits some 
scrutiny. “Security rights” refer to rights of a lienholder. Priority rights in the context 
of the Regulation usually refers to the rights of employees in insolvency related 
situations.  
Upon scrutiny, however, the conclusion that an insolvency proceeding with universal 
jurisdiction is incompatible with the exercise of security rights different from those 
of the state in which the proceeding is held, is erroneous. For example, under United 
States bankruptcy law, state law is applied to determine, for example, the secured 
status of a creditor, the validity of a security interest, the method of perfection, the 
law controlling a deed of trust or security agreement, or the validity of a judgment 
lien. Security rights are determined not by a harmonized federal law, but by the law 
of the state in which the property is located. Thus, although the property is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in which the proceeding was commenced, 
the secured status of the creditor is determined under state law. And yet, this is not 
a problem for a U.S. bankruptcy court, since that court is perfectly capable of 
applying relevant state law to a particular asset, while the harmonized federal law 
applies to the proceedings as a whole. Although there is no “uniform system of 
security rights,” that does not preclude a single universal proceeding.  
The second rationale given for the hybrid approach of the Regulation is to preserve 
the priority given to certain classes of creditors under national insolvency laws. This 
has generally come to refer to the rights of employees in insolvency cases, for 
example, by providing priority status over other classes of creditors. Appropriately, 
this has already been the subject of legislation on a supranational level.8 This does 
indeed have to be harmonized for the orderly administration of a universal 
insolvency proceeding because similarly situated unsecured creditors cannot be 
treated differently in a case, both for administrative reasons and for issues of 
fairness. Indeed, the bankruptcy system in the United States provides that creditor 
priority is subject to a harmonized federal bankruptcy law, so that regardless of 
where the case is filed, unpaid wages, consumer deposits, taxes, general unsecured 
claims, are all subject to the same priority scheme. With regard to the “preservation 
of priority” rationale, therefore, that has been proven not to be valid as 
                                                
8 See, for example, Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of 
their employer 
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demonstrated both in Europe and the U.S., since a territoriality carveout is obviously 
not required to protect employees. Based on the foregoing, the two rationale for 
moving away from universality and adopting territorial proceedings need to be 
revisited in the context of the review of the Regulation.  
Territoriality - incompatible with the values and goals of the EU 
By its very nature, territoriality discriminates between domestic creditors and those 
from another state. It flies in the face of mutual trust, is inconsistent with EU 
fundamental goals and policy, prevents the effective reorganization of companies 
with cross border subsidiaries or branches, and creates a logistical nightmare in the 
administration of cases. In the cross border context, a territorial proceeding, with 
assets first being available for local creditors without equal sharing with foreign 
creditors is inherently unfair and abhorrent to the concept of the internal market, 
equal treatment and non- discrimination. 
Territoriality also violates the fundamental rationale of the insolvency/bankruptcy 
process, which is to avoid the race to the courthouse in order to prevent one creditor 
from taking action to get paid before other creditors, or to prevent a single creditor 
from grabbing an asset or freezing an account vital to ongoing operations. 
Preventing unilateral action by one creditor and allows all creditors to share equally 
and maximizes value for all. In fact, even creditors who are paid first because of 
territorial liquidations may do worse than they would in a reorganization case or an 
orderly universal liquidation. Territoriality, rather than benefitting creditors in a 
particular territory, may in fact result in worse treatment.  
Creditors shouldn’t have an advantage based on the country in which they are 
located. The only advantage should be between secured and unsecured, priority 
unsecured or general unsecured status. A secured creditor is entitled to better 
treatment than an unsecured creditor because it paid for that privilege and in so 
doing, has bargained for superior rights. A priority creditor is entitled to better 
treatment because a policy decision has been made to protect a class of creditors. 
But for one group of general unsecured creditors to get an advantage over others 
based on location is discriminatory, antithetical to single market, and might just be a 
bad economic decision based on wrong assumptions by states advocating 
territoriality. 
Territoriality - time for a second look 
The adoption of the Regulation did not mean that the issues that had been debated 
for forty years had finally been resolved. On the contrary, the Regulation was 
intended as a short term political compromise:  
“The relationship between main proceedings and territorial insolvency proceedings 
represents a compromise which was the outcome of many years of discussion. It 
remains to be seen in practice whether the individual provisions can be applied by 
courts and liquidators as they stand or whether they will make excessive demands 
on the participants (for example ‘conversion’ as referred to in Article 37). The 
regulation itself should therefore lay down that the Commission is to assess 
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experience of its implementation and propose improvements, and when it is to do so 
(Amendment 2).”9 
Despite the compromise, it is clear that the Parliament was opposed to secondary 
territorial proceedings. The Parliament “considers that there exists no need to allow 
for secondary proceedings after the opening of the main proceedings” (citing the 
Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 23 
February 2000, A50039/2000 (final) at 7 and 10). Jona Israel, in his comprehensive 
study of the Regulation states:  
“At least on one point Parliament has expressed a fundamental critique of the 
present text of the Regulation. The European Parliament considers that there exists 
no need to allow for secondary proceedings after the opening of main proceedings; 
'here the unitary nature of main proceedings should prevail absolutely'. [citation 
omitted]. Instead, it considers the principle of universality 'inherent in the logic of 
the internal market and the creation of a uniform European legal area'. However, the 
mechanism of secondary proceedings has been critical to the adoption of the 
Regulation as it now stands.” (Israel, p. 251-252). 
Other contemporaneous documents reveal serious concerns with the Regulation. The 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, among other points, expresses a 
preference for unitary proceedings rather than the secondary proceeding 
mechanism.10 Further, it emphasizes “the need to avoid an excessively complex 
system which might prove unworkable in practice” (section 3.1.3), calls the proposed 
Regulation “extremely modest and unambitious” (section 3.2.2); expresses a clear 
preference for unified rather than territorial proceedings and explicitly rejecting 
secondary proceedings (section 3.4) and the “insurmountable problems” which would 
be caused by concurrent primary and secondary proceedings (section 3.4.3). Indeed, 
the concept of concurrent proceedings involving the same company conflict with the 
basic premise of the Brussels I Regulation (lis pendens-related actions). 
In summary, the history shows that the Regulation was meant as a short term 
experiment and that the legislators never envisioned the compromise, which is at 
the foundation of the Regulation, to be a permanent solution. Rather, it was to be 
reviewed on a regular basis in order to determine whether it could actually work in 
light of the serious reservations expressed during the approval process. Page 7/17 
of the Parliament Report shows that the Parliament proposed an amendment 
requiring the first review to be five years after the Regulation entered into force.11 
This was later changed to seven years, with subsequent five year intervals. This 
apparently did not happen and the Regulation now provides in article 46, for a 
review in 2012. But the explanatory note in the Parliament Report after the proposed 
amendment is revealing, if not prophetic: “It remains to be seen in practice whether 
the individual provisions of the regulation can be applied by courts and liquidators 
                                                
9 Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on insolvency proceedings 23 February 2000  
(9178/1999 – C5-0069/1999 – 1999/0806(CNS)) A5-0039/2000 Committee on Legal Affairs and the 
Internal Market (hereinafter, the Parliament Report”) p. 10/17 
10 OJ 2000 C75/1 26 January 2000 The report Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 
‘Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Finland with a view to the adoption 
of a Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings, submitted to the Council on 26 May 1999’(1) 
(2000/C 75/01) OJ 2000 C75/1,  
11 OJ 2000 C346/4 Amendment 5 
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as they stand or whether they will make excessive demands on the participants.” 
(Parliament Report, p. 7/17). 
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2 Harmonization 
Harmonization, although not the focus of this paper, needs to be mentioned because 
it is an essential part of any discussion of the Regulation. Indeed, the salient 
characteristic of the Regulation, a regime in which a main proceeding with universal 
effect is moderated by a limited territorial proceeding, is a result of this reluctance 
to harmonize, which in turn, is a result of the reluctance of Member states to give up 
whatever perceived advantage might be available to local creditors by virtue of 
advantageous provisions of the national insolvency regime.  
Thus, on its face, the Regulation rejects the harmonization of insolvency law. Recital 
(11) provides: “This Regulation acknowledges the fact that as a result of widely 
differing substantive laws it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings with 
universal scope in the entire Community.”  
Whether this makes any sense in a practical or theoretical analysis is part of the 
harmonization debate which is not the point of the discussion in this section. The 
point here is that although harmonization is rejected at the outset because it is 
considered by the drafters as impractical, a discussion is important background 
because it is the very rejection of harmonization which is the seed from which the 
Regulation is born.  
The irony of this conclusion did not escape the drafters of the Virgos Schmit Report: 
“It seems hard to accept that undertakings' activities are increasingly being regulated 
by Community law while national law alone continues to apply in the event of the 
failure of an undertaking.” Nevertheless, even though the Regulation embodies a 
definite position against harmonization, the matter is far from resolved, and the 
tension between harmonization and state sovereignty persists in the insolvency 
context and is important to the 2012 review of the Regulation in several respects 
which are discussed below.  
First, the lack of harmonization in the insolvency field impedes the operation of the 
internal market. Second, and as discussed below, the lack of harmonization is the 
direct cause of forum shopping, because, simply stated, if the law were the same in 
all member states, there would be no need to shop around for the most 
advantageous law. Finally, the lack of harmonization has created numerous specific 
legal problems which are addressed in the report produced for the Parliament in 
which top European insolvency scholars and professionals outline fifteen areas of the 
Regulation in which harmonization is required (hereinafter, the “Harmonization 
Report”).12 
The Harmonization Report identifies fifteen separate problems that “might occur in 
the absence of common rules on insolvency”, for example: 
                                                
12 Directorate General For Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional 
Affairs, Legal Affairs, Harmonisation Of Insolvency Law At EU Level, April 2010.  Also, many of 
these harmonization ideas are stated in an earlier article by Bob Wessels, “Twenty Suggestions for a 
Makeover of the EU Insolvency Regulation”,  International Caselaw Alert, No. 12, October 31, 2006, 
pp. 68-73. 
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• Some states’ insolvency laws provide for a general stay on creditors 
enforcement actions after the commencement of a proceedings, other don’t;  
• Each state has different ranking of creditors;  
• Each state has different rules on filing and verification of claims, different 
rules on termination of contracts, thereby resulting in forum shopping;  
• There is a lack of rules on coordination of insolvency proceedings with 
respect to different companies belonging to the same group of companies; 
• There are widely different rules on who administers the insolvency 
proceedings; 
• There are different rules on avoidance actions, i.e. recovery of transfers of 
assets, different time periods and criteria for clawbacks; and 
• When a secondary proceeding is opened, the law applicable is the law of the 
member state where the secondary proceedings were opened, so that two 
different sets of law apply to one company in two different concurrent 
proceedings. 
This paper is not focused on the harmonization debate and there is certainly no 
need to duplicate the efforts of the well reasoned and comprehensive report 
prepared by leading insolvency professionals. Harmonization is a major undertaking 
and involves fundamental substantive revisions of the Regulation. Pending the 
discussion and/or adoption of revisions, this paper proposes a different solution.  
The debate that has already occurred in the context of the harmonization of criminal 
law is instructive. In his article “Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary?”13 
Spencer analyzes the ideological and practical reasons for harmonization of criminal 
law in the European Union. He does not give much credence to the historical 
ideological reason for harmonization, i.e. that one particular set of rules is best and 
so should be adopted by all. While this is what occurred historically, for example, the 
imposition of the Napoleonic code by France, it should no longer be relevant in 
Europe today. 
The ideological reason for harmonization of criminal law that he finds most valid, 
and which is also directly applicable to insolvency law, is expressed as follows: 
“In a democracy, where the rights of individuals are recognized, there are certain 
basic rules that penal law must respect and certain unacceptable rules and features 
that it must avoid. For each country to keep its own separate criminal justice system, 
formed according to its national traditions, is right and proper. But if these systems 
do not conform to these minimum standards they must be modified so that they do.” 
(Spencer, p. 47). 
In the criminal context, Spencer asserts, the EU's accession to the European 
Convention of Human Rights has lead to the introduction of a harmonized set of 
basic procedural rules, relating to protection from overly invasive evidence 
                                                
13 John R. Spencer, Why is the harmonization of penal law necessary?, Harmonisation and harmonising 
measures in criminal law, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of the 
colloquium, Amsterdam, 13-14 December 2001 . Available at 
http://www.knaw.nl/Content/Internet_KNAW/publicaties/pdf/20021103.pdf 
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gathering, i.e. phone tapping, and rights to participate in the often inquisitorial 
pretrial phase of criminal procedure. Thus, the adoption of ECHR respects the 
national traditions, does not harmonize the criminal law of the Member States, but 
rather, adds a limited overlay of basic procedural rules in order to ensure certain 
minimal standards.  
It is both necessary and appropriate to apply this model to insolvency in general and 
the Regulation specifically, for a number of reasons. The most obvious and indeed, 
the most compelling, is simply that the Regulation does not provide a set of 
procedural rules. Section IV below includes a detailed analysis of the specific 
provisions of the Regulation which require, but lack, procedural rules. Perhaps the 
legislators expected that Member States would provide the necessary procedural 
rules to implement the Regulation. However, this was not a reasonable expectation 
because the Regulation deals with cross border issues and there is no reason to 
expect that national laws would cover this area. Whatever the reason for the 
omission, the reality is that in the ensuing decade since the Regulation went into 
effect, nobody has filled in the missing rules. 
As described in section III below, the absence of procedural rules has resulted in the 
lack of a minimum standard of fairness, notice, availability of information, due 
process and opportunity to be heard. The implementation of the procedural rules 
suggested below is consistent with Union conceptual framework as suggested by 
Spencer. Using this framework to address these omissions in the Regulation makes 
sense. 
Spencer points out that it is “right and proper” to keep a criminal law system which 
respects the national traditions, but that such a system should, if needed, be 
modified to comply with minimum standards. Whether the concept of a national 
criminal tradition exists can be debated. The existence of a national insolvency 
tradition however cannot seriously be maintained. Nothing about insolvency requires 
recognition of a historical or national character. The fact that debtors were hung in 
17th century England, or that their benches were broken in 16th century Italy, is not 
a historical cultural legacy that any state seeks to preserve.  
The point here is that by working within the existing Regulation and applying a 
minimal overlay of simple procedural rules necessary to ensure minimum standards 
of fairness is both consistent with the Regulation, and as discussed below, the 
rulings of the European Court of Justice. This model of limited procedural 
harmonization will be developed and applied in the sections that follow. Prior to 
that, however, there is one final area that needs to be discussed. 
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3 The Jurisdictional Mechanism of the Regulation: COMI, Forum 
Shopping and Corporate Groups – How the Regulation works (and 
how it doesn’t) 
At the core of the Regulation are its jurisdictional and choice of law provisions. 
Because the Regulation is, at least in part, universal in its jurisdiction, and because 
where the case is filed determines the choice of law, the determination of where the 
case may be filed is of critical importance and often outcome determinative. It is for 
this reason that “center of main interests” (“COMI”) has dominated the scholarship 
and case law, focusing the discussion on where the case can be filed, rather than on 
what happens after the case is filed. The COMI issues are not what this paper is 
about, rather, the purpose of the analysis which follows is to show that even this 
issue, which has dominated the discussion, can and should be dealt with in a manner 
consistent with due process, through procedural rules that, albeit absent from the 
Regulation, are necessary for its operation. 
3.1 The Fundamental Jurisdictional Provisions of the Regulation 
In summary, the relevant jurisdictional provisions of the Regulation are as follows: 
Article 3-International jurisdiction 
1. The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of 
a debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the 
registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in 
the absence of proof to the contrary. 
Thus, Article 3, par. 1 of the Regulation requires that the main case be filed 
where the debtor's center of main interests is located.  
Par. 2, however, allows for the opening of a secondary case, which partially 
divests the first court of jurisdiction. This secondary case must be a 
liquidation case only, and is subject to a different jurisdictional rule. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 provide: 
2. Where the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated within the 
territory of a Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have 
jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he 
possesses an establishment within the territory of that other Member State. 
The effects of those proceedings shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor 
situated in the territory of the latter Member State. 
3. Where insolvency proceedings have been opened under paragraph 1, any 
proceedings opened subsequently under paragraph 2 shall be secondary 
proceedings. These latter proceedings must be winding-up proceedings. 
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This scheme is further explained in recital 12: 
This Regulation enables the main insolvency proceedings to be opened in the 
Member State where the debtor has the centre of his main interests. These 
proceedings have universal scope and aim at encompassing all the debtor's 
assets. To protect the diversity of interests, this Regulation permits 
secondary proceedings to be opened to run in parallel with the main 
proceedings. Secondary proceedings may be opened in the Member State 
where the debtor has an establishment. The effects of secondary proceedings 
are limited to the assets located in that State. Mandatory rules of 
coordination with the main proceedings satisfy the need for unity in the 
Community. 
Once the main or secondary proceedings have been opened, they must be 
recognized in all other member states. [Article 16] Further, any rulings from the 
court regarding the conduct of the proceedings should be automatically recognized 
by courts of other states. [Recital 22] The forgoing provisions are the essence of the 
Regulation and its uniqueness lies in its mechanism of concurrent universal and 
territorial proceedings. 
Yet the language of the Regulation raises myriad questions. What are the “diversity 
of interests” referred to in recital 12 that are being protected by the opening of 
secondary proceedings? What are these “mandatory rules of coordination with the 
main proceedings” that “satisfy the need for unity in the Community”? How does the 
COMI test work? Why is it so easily manipulated? What is the COMI of a corporate 
group? How can two parallel proceedings be administered and doesn't that conflict 
with the basic tenants of the Brussels I Regulation?  
3.2 The COMI question as a due process issue 
COMI is critical under the Regulation because it determines where the case may be 
filed, which law applies, which court hears the case, and which procedure, whether 
liquidation or reorganization is available. Since insolvency schemes are so different, 
the forum is outcome determinative. One jurisdiction may allow a creditor to set off 
a debt, others may prevent it completely or only during a specified period of time. 
Other courts may allow creditors to propose a reorganization plan, or form a 
creditors' committee, while in others, all decisions are in the hands of a court 
appointed liquidator. One state may allow for a reorganization process in which all 
constituents, debtor, creditors, participate in a negotiated resolution; others may 
allow only a strictly administrative liquidation process without any significant 
participation.  
Notwithstanding these critical issues which are determined by COMI, the 
determination of the COMI itself is done at the very outset of the case by the court 
where the case was filed, and often without any notice either to creditors or other 
interested parties. Further, once the decision is made, it is final and non-appealable, 
at least in practical terms, if not in strict legal terms. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
the COMI determination has become the overwhelming focus of the scholarship, 
debate and case law. 
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Legitimate expectations of creditors as a COMI element 
Article 3(1) of the Regulation provides for the presumption that the center of main 
interests of a debtor is where the registered office is, but that such presumption may 
be rebutted. Yet, interestingly, this objective test is tempered by a different 
standard; the COMI is not only the place of incorporation, but the Regulation further 
describes COMI in recital (13) which provides that the "centre of main interests 
should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his 
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”  
Recital 13 raises a number of issues: the effect of “should”, the meaning of 
“administration of his interests on a regular basis”, and the level of knowledge 
required in order to be “ascertainable”, who are eligible or relevant third parties, and 
whether the level of knowledge is the same for all third parties. The focus of this 
paper is not on COMI issues, and the point here is not to analyze what this language 
means or what courts have said that it means. The point is that the Regulation 
requires courts to come to many factual and legal conclusions in connection with the 
COMI determination.  
The COMI determination is one of the most critical issues in the case. It is highly 
dependent on factual determinations and application of those facts to the applicable 
law, which itself is less than explicit or straightforward. Yet, this determination must 
be made on the first day of the case, usually before any creditors or any other party 
is provided notice. Further, this determination must then be automatically 
recognized without being subject to review by the court of any other member state. 
Therein lies the problem. That problem only becomes exacerbated when other 
factors arise, for example, when the debtor is a part of a group of companies, and 
may be either the parent or subsidiary of a related company, or where the registered 
office has changed, or when any number of additional factual scenarios arise. 
The traditional choice of place of incorporation or “registered office” as the 
appropriate jurisdiction to file insolvency proceedings gives certainty, both in the 
administrative sense, and in addressing what is commonly referred to as the 
legitimate expectations of creditors, meaning that a creditor should be allowed to 
deal with a company in insolvency in the same place that it dealt with the company 
prior to insolvency. This emphasis on creditor expectation appears repeatedly in the 
legislative history. The Virgos-Schmit Report, paragraph 75, provides that: 
“Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is therefore important that international 
jurisdiction (which, as we will see, entails the application of the insolvency laws of 
that Contracting State) be based on a place known to the debtor’s potential 
creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be assumed in the case of 
insolvency to be calculated”. 
The Parliament Report was even more explicit about the need to acknowledge 
creditor expectations in the prior version of recital 13: “The centre of main interests 
is taken as meaning a place with which a debtor regularly has very close contacts, in 
which his manifold commercial interests are concentrated and in which the bulk of 
his assets is for the most part situated. The creditor is also very familiar with that 
place.” [p.6/17] Although clumsy in its drafting, the meaning is very clear. 
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In whichever way the COMI test is applied, it must be applied in a way that takes into 
consideration the legitimate expectations of creditors, and therefore, creditors must 
be involved in the COMI determination. The protection of legitimate expectations is a 
general principle of Union law which indeed ranks superior to EU secondary law, 
including the Regulation. The Regulation is less than explicit in this regard and in 
the absence of procedural rules implementing that protection, the practical result is 
that the requirement is essentially ignored.  
The legitimate expectations of creditors must reflect the realities of the single 
market and current business realities. A creditor today cannot legitimately expect 
that it will have a local relationship in its regular business with a company, or if there 
is a local relationship, that it would be through the main office rather than a regional 
office or representative. All the more so, a creditor cannot legitimately expect that 
an insolvency proceeding for that company would be filed in a court convenient to 
the creditor, rather than where the company’s main office is located. Even further, 
and this directly relates to the whole procedure of territorial proceedings, a creditor 
today, when the single market is a reality, cannot legitimately expect that it can deal 
with, be paid, and in the event of a liquidation, be satisfied, from the local or even 
the national assets of the debtor. Thus, the local advantage granted in territorial 
proceedings are indeed beyond what can legitimately be expected by a creditor.  
The only truly legitimate expectation for a creditor today is that they not be deceived 
or kept in the dark, so that when an insolvency case is filed, they be given notice, 
access to information, an opportunity to be heard and a real and practical way to 
participate at all stages of the insolvency proceedings, especially when so much is 
determined by the COMI determination which will typically occur on the first day of 
the case.  
COMI at the ECJ 
These COMI issues are often dealt with in courts of Member States, and the study of 
those cases is beyond the scope of this paper. One case however requires mention 
because of its far reaching implications. In the EU courts, the first definitive analysis 
of the COMI issue appeared in the case Eurofood IFSC, Ltd.14  
The case involved an Irish remote financing company, Eurofood, the subsidiary of 
one of the many Parmalat entities based in Italy. “Eurofood IFSC Ltd ('Eurofood') is a 
company incorporated and registered in Ireland. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Parmalat, a company incorporated in Italy which operated through subsidiary 
companies in more than 30 countries worldwide.”15 Eurofood's purpose was to obtain 
financing for other subsidiaries under the favorable tax treatment under Irish law. As 
seen below however, its actual operations were limited, the degree of which 
becomes a key factual issue. 
The ECJ analysis follows the Regulation closely. The logical sequence of the analysis 
followed by the court was as follows:  
1. The COMI is presumed to be the place of the registered office, citing article 3(1); 
                                                
14 Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (May 2, 2006)  
15 par. 25 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs EU: Case C-341/04 Celex No. 604C0341 
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2. The COMI “should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by 
third parties” citing recital 13 of the Regulation [Eurofood, par. 32] The criteria must 
be both objective and ascertainable by third parties “in order to ensure certainty and 
foreseeability concerning the determination of the court with jurisdiction to open 
main insolvency proceedings.” [par. 33];  
3. The presumption that the COMI is the place of the registered office can therefore 
only be rebutted by factors which are objective and ascertainable by third parties. 
[par. 34] Such a situation would exist, for example, in the case of a “letterbox” 
company, where such a company did not carry out any business in the Member state 
in which its registered office was located. [par. 35] Under the standard set forth by 
the court, therefore, only having no business in the Member state in which the 
registered office is located is sufficient to rebut the presumption; 
4. However, and this is the conclusion of the Court relevant to the preliminary 
question posed in the case, “where a company carries on its business” [par. 36] 
(apparently some minimal yet unspecified amount of business) in the Member state 
where the registered office is located, “the mere fact that its economic choices are or 
can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not enough to 
rebut the presumption laid down by the Regulation.” [par. 36]; 
The Opinion of AG Jacobs sheds a little more light on the level of business required. 
He notes that the administration of Eurofoods was contracted out to Bank of 
America, so it is likely there were really no operations and no employees in Ireland, 
but that contracting out operations was sufficient to overcome the letterbox 
standard. Hence, the practical standard under Eurofoods appears to be that anything 
more than a post office box is enough to establish a COMI, which is something to 
bear in mind in the discussion below regarding forum shopping. Even more to the 
point of this paper, this shows that subtle factual and legal determinations may be 
required in the COMI determination and consequently, there is a need to make these 
outcome determinative decisions on the basis on adequate notice and opportunity to 
be heard by all affected parties. 
3.3 Forum shopping 
We have just seen the ease with which the COMI could be manipulated under the 
applicable standard. The incentive is clear since the COMI determines which court 
has jurisdiction, which laws apply, from which country the liquidator or administrator 
is appointed, as well as many other legal and practical issues. Yet surprisingly, 
elimination of forum shopping is a stated goal of the regulation. The Regulation, 
however, actually achieves the opposite effect, enabling forum shopping.  
The Regulation provides in recital 4: “It is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or judicial 
proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable 
legal position (forum shopping).” Forum shopping, as implied in recital 4, is a 
pejorative term, implying a less than forthright manipulation of the jurisdictional 
rules in order to achieve a result different from that which would be achieved by the 
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intent of the rule, or what is what is often referred to as “slick” lawyering by 
disapproving judges. This raises a number of issues.  
First, from a client standpoint, forum shopping is good. It means that the lawyer has 
picked the most favorable forum for the client, and the failure to do so could be 
considered malpractice.16 From the standpoint of the Regulation and from an overall 
legislative standpoint, however, forum shopping is a problem, because it means that 
the law is imprecise and ineffective because it allows companies or their lawyers to 
pick a forum different than the one that they should be in according to the intent of 
the legislation. The intent of the Regulation in general and its COMI rules in 
particular, is to avoid this manipulation.  
Yet, the language of recital 4 is imprecise and confused, stating that the Regulation 
seeks to avoid the “transfer [of] assets or judicial proceedings from one Member 
State to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position (forum 
shopping).” Neither of these however are forum shopping. Forum shopping means 
filing a case in the most favorable forum. But, once a judicial proceeding is pending, 
it may be possible to transfer the proceeding to another court, but that action is 
subject to judicial review. Forum shopping is a problem because the choice of court 
is done by the company or its lawyers, prior to filing the case, thereby generally 
evading judicial review, since the inclination of a court is to retain jurisdiction rather 
than sua sponte transferring the case elsewhere. The “transfer of judicial 
proceedings” is not forum shopping. The sentence just doesn’t make sense.  
Further, the transfer of assets is not a method of forum shopping simply because the 
location of assets does not establish a jurisdictional basis. The legislative history, 
specifically the Parliament Report [page 6/17] indicates that the location of assets 
was one of the factors used as a jurisdictional basis in the old version of recital 13, 
which allowed jurisdiction “where the bulk” of a debtors assets were located. That 
rule however was not adopted in the Regulation, which does not mention the 
location of assets as a factor in determining COMI.17  
Asset transfer in the insolvency context usually brings to mind the transfer of assets 
without consideration prior to insolvency with the intent or with the effect of 
removing assets from the reach of creditors, or in U.S. terms, a fraudulent transfer. 
But there is no jurisdictional factor in this type of transfer, and the transfer of assets 
to a third party would not establish a jurisdictional basis for the debtor/transferor to 
file an insolvency case in a particular jurisdiction under any reasonable legal system. 
                                                
16 See discussion, Wolf-Georg Ringe, Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation, Oxford 
Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 33/2008 August 2008, in which the author questions the “hostile 
attitude” taken by the Regulation against forum shopping. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1209822.  
17 In fact, one astute commentator has used the sloppy drafting to argue that forum shopping is actually 
allowed under the Regulation because it does not involve the transfer or assets or judicial proceedings. 
See R Hänel, “Take the Debt Drain ─ Discharge-tourism Coming Up Roses?’ INSOL World (First 
Quarter 2010) 30-31 arguing that the transfer of an individual’s COMI with a view to a more 
favourable bankruptcy regime does not involve a transfer of assets’ or ‘judicial proceedings’ and so 
does not conflict with recital (4). See page 11 of ‘Bankruptcy Tourism’ under the EC Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings: A View from England and Wales, Adrian Walters and Anton Smith. 
http://www.ntu.ac.uk/PSS/Nottingham%20Law%20School/Publications/99914.pdf 
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In short, the asset transfer reference in the context of forum shopping doesn’t make 
sense.  
The legislative history supports the viewpoint that the earlier drafters did not 
consider asset transfer to be a forum shopping issue, but rather, an issue of hiding 
assets from creditors, by keeping them out of any forum. The Parliament Report 
mentions that the lack of a universal proceeding allowed debtors to transfer assets 
to keep them from creditors. Page 12/17 states: 
”Such regulation of cross-border effects at the national level constitutes a problem to 
the extent that insolvency judgments are frequently not recognised in foreign 
countries. Accordingly, the liquidator of the insolvent debtor has no access to the 
debtor’s foreign assets. That means that creditors must open insolvency or 
enforcement proceedings in one or more foreign countries as well, and that gives 
the insolvent debtor time to transfer his assets and protect them from the creditors’ 
attempts to gain access to his estate.”  
It is much more likely that forum shopping is accomplished by the transfer not of 
assets or judicial proceedings, but by transfer of the registered office itself. There is 
no prohibition of moving a registered office prior to filing, although some member 
states prohibit the move within a certain period prior to filing in order to establish a 
new COMI. But there is no prohibition under the Regulation. On the contrary, under 
EU law, a company can move its registered office to another state, or a company with 
its registered office in one member state may actually have its COMI in another 
member state.18  
The problem, therefore, is that the COMI test itself, intended as the solution to 
forum shopping, has actually enabled the practice to take place and as a result, since 
the adoption of the Regulation, a new industry of “insolvency tourism” has arisen, 
generally sending both personal and corporate cases to the UK from other member 
states.19  
It is ironic that Member States, in wishing to protect their own sovereignty by 
creating a territorial exception to universal proceedings, have instead created the 
unintended negative consequence of sending cases out of their own jurisdiction 
where the cases actually belong. This is a far more egregious affront to sovereignty. 
By insisting on this regime, the Regulation itself has fostered a system of forum 
shopping, which takes cases which rightfully belong in one state, and moves them to 
another, usually the UK. It is indeed ironic that Germany, one of the two sponsors of 
                                                
18 See Harmonization Report, p. 5 
19 See- The rise of insolvency tourism-An enquiry into the centre of main interests of natural persons, 
J.D. Weber, Leiden, Jan. 2010. This is an excellent thesis on the issue of forum shopping in personal 
bankruptcy cases, explaining the industry of bankruptcy tourism which leads to the filing of cases in 
the UK by citizens of other European countries.  See also, “Bankruptcy Tourism’ under the EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A View from England and Wales” Adrian Walters and Anton 
Smith, demonstrating how German insolvency cases end up in the UK. Available at: 
http://www.ntu.ac.uk/PSS/Nottingham%20Law%20School/Publications/99914.pdf 
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the Regulation (along with Finland), is apparently the country that loses most cases 
this way. 20 
3.4 Corporate Groups 
Simply put, the Regulation has no provision allowing corporate groups to reorganize 
together. For that matter, they cannot even liquidate together. Even worse, the whole 
mechanism of territorial proceedings, which must be liquidation, prevents any 
reorganization of a company with cross border affiliates. Related companies can be 
liquidated separately, on a piece meal basis, but not reorganized. By requiring the 
filing of a proceeding in the COMI of the individual member of a group, rather than 
in the COMI of the parent or affiliate, numerous problems are created from a 
business and legal standpoint. Putting it bluntly, this provision is a death knell for 
cross border companies seeking to reorganize. 
In contrast to forum shopping discussed above, this problem is nothing new nor an 
unexpected or unintended result, but was evident even at the time of the 
Convention: “The Convention offers no rule for groups of affiliated companies 
(parent-subsidiary schemes). The general rule to open or to consolidate insolvency 
proceedings against any of the related companies as a principal or jointly liable 
debtor is that jurisdiction must exist according to the Convention for each of the 
concerned debtors with a separate legal entity.” (Virgos Schmit Report, par. 76).  
Leading insolvency experts agree that the problem arises because the Regulation is 
from a time before the concept of reorganization had entered into the European 
consciousness, when liquidation was the only option, and before cross border 
operations through affiliated companies was the norm.21 Now, however, such 
operations are the norm and cross border entities are inextricably intertwined. In 
Eurofoods, for example, Parmalat, incorporated in Italy, operated through 
subsidiaries in over thirty countries. Eurofoods' obligations were guaranteed by 
Parmalat and Eurofoods itself provided financing facilities for other subsidiaries.22  
                                                
20 This statement is based purely on anecdotal evidence. Actual statistical evidence to determine how 
the Regulation works in the “real world” could only be obtained through a functioning unified 
European insolvency register. 
21 See: Multinational Groups of Companies under the EC Insolvency Regulation: Where Do We Stand? 
2009; Bob Wesselswww.bobwessels.nl: “The lack of provisions concerning multinational groups of 
companies has been classified as an omission. However, not all critics take into account the fact that 
cross-border insolvency within Europe was discussed for over forty years before the Regulation finally 
enacted. The discussions concerned complex problems. At the time, the decision to postpone “group 
insolvencies” to a later date may have been considered both politically and practically prudent. 
Furthermore, the Regulation reflects thinking of the 1980s and 1990s, when the phenomenon of groups 
of companies was not as current as in the first decade of the 21st century and, moreover, in European 
domestic insolvency laws reorganisation or rescue of companies was not the prevailing option.” 
 
See also: Coordination Of Multinational Corporate Group Insolvencies: Solving The Comi Issue, 
Insolvencies of Corporate Group under the E.C. Regulation, Gabriel Moss, Christoph G. Paulus, June 
7-8, 2010, International Insolvency Institute Tenth Annual International Insolvency Conference: 
“The problem is particularly acute in the case of reorganisation proceedings. Unfortunately, the 
Regulation, perhaps because it largely reproduces a Convention negotiated over many years and largely 
prior to the vigorous recent movement of Member States in favour of reorganisation, adheres to the 
old-fashioned approach of ignoring group structures” 
22 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs EU: Case C-341/04 Celex No. 604C0341, par. 25, 29. 
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No reason was articulated for the omission of provisions for corporate groups in the 
Regulation or legislative history. The solution to the problem, however, is not 
difficult. Under the system in the United States, for example, the distinction is made 
between administrative consolidation and substantive consolidation. 
[11U.S.C.sec.302] “In substantive consolidation, the intercompany liabilities of the 
subject companies are eliminated, the assets of these subject companies are pooled 
and the third party liabilities of the subject companies are satisfied from this single 
pool of assets.”23 
In one moderately sized U.S. case, for example, over 50 separate corporate entities 
operated in several states, and forty-eight of the entities were consolidated 
substantively because they shared a common cash management system, had 
complex inter-corporate debt and cross collateralization of assets, and numerous 
inter-corporate guarantees.24 In such a situation, the parties would typically request 
that the court issue an order for substantive consolidation which typically would 
provide: 
• All intercompany claims between the consolidated debtors would be 
extinguished; 
• All assets and liabilities of each of the consolidated debtors would be merged 
or treated as if they were merged with the assets and liabilities of the parent;  
• Any obligation of a consolidated debtor and all guarantees thereof by one or 
more of the other consolidated debtors would be deemed to be one 
obligation of the parent;  
• The stock, if any, of the consolidated debtors other than the parent would be 
cancelled;  
• Each claim filed or to be filed against any consolidated debtor would be 
deemed to be filed only against the parent and deemed to be a single claim 
against the parent;  
• All claims based upon guarantees of collection, payment or performance 
made by the consolidated debtors as to the obligations of another 
consolidated debtor would be released.25  
Substantive consolidation is not granted without a substantial legal basis for 
ignoring the corporate separateness and consolidating assets and liabilities and is 
the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, it is necessary in those cases where 
it would be inequitable to maintain separateness. Administrative consolidation, in 
contrast to substantive consolidation, brings cases before one court, but doesn't 
combine assets or liabilities or affect the substantive rights of creditors. 
Administrative consolidation is intended to reduce the need for filing duplicative 
pleadings and duplicate notice to creditors, but not to consolidate assets or 
liabilities.  
                                                
23 Prevalence Of Substantive Consolidation In Large Bankruptcies From 2000 To 2004: Preliminary 
Results, William H.Widen, American Bankruptcy Institute Review, Vol 14:47, p. 47 
24 In re Family Health Services, Inc. and related entities, Central District of California, filed 1989 
25 Order Granting Motion For Substantive Consolidation Of Debtors’ Estates, In re SI Restructuring, 
Inc. Available at 
http://www.haynesboone.com/schlotzskys/%281181%29%20Order%20on%20Substantive%20Consoli
dation.pdf  
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The U.S. model of administrative consolidation, however does not translate easily to 
the EU because of the lack of a harmonized insolvency law. Administrative 
consolidation, which is the simpler of the two processes, actually would be the most 
difficult to apply in the absence of a harmonized insolvency law, since one court 
would be expected to apply different substantive law in each of the administratively 
consolidated proceedings. Substantive consolidation however would essentially 
merge all of the entities into one entity, would not require harmonization since the 
law of the country of the COMI of the parent would apply to all the substantively 
consolidated entities. One simple yet effective solution that has been proposed is to 
identify an “enterprise center of main interest”, a single country where the center of 
main interest for the group is located and require the filing of all insolvency cases 
for the group, a single case for each entity, but all filed in the same court, with the 
cases being administratively consolidated.26 
The issue has also been dealt with in Harmonization Report, as well as the followup 
report of March 2011. Point XIII on page 24 of the Harmonization Report identifies 
the problem as one of the main issues that requires a solution [p. 33]. In the 
followup reports of March 2011, the group issue is dealt with in a separate dedicated 
report which proposes, inter alia, substantive or administrative consolidation, 
coordination of hearings in different courts, appointment of same insolvency 
representative for a group, and cooperation between courts and insolvency 
representatives.  
The Regulation is a creation of the last forty years. That's why it doesn't adequately 
deal with corporate groups. Now that we are in an era of multi-level cross-border 
group enterprise structures, updating is required, not only to deal with this specific 
issue, but also to address the notice and fairness issues that arise in so many of the 
areas of the Regulation. Another one of those areas follows.  
3.5 The Problem with Concurrent Proceedings 
Perhaps the most problematic area of the Regulation, both with regard to procedural 
issues and the issues of notice and fairness, is the mechanism of concurrent main 
and secondary proceedings. Under the Regulation, the same company can be subject 
to concurrent insolvency proceedings in two different member states, involving the 
same assets, the same creditors, and the same debtor company, but the priority 
among creditors will change once the secondary case is filed, as will the law 
governing the disposition of the assets.  
The creditors will be the same, yet their rights will be different in each case: “The 
Regulation 1346/2000 provides that proceedings under Article 3(2) comprise only 
assets in the Member State where the proceedings are opened whereas all creditors 
may file their claims in such territorial proceedings. Thus Article 3(2) proceedings 
are territorial with respect to assets and universal with respect to creditors.” 27  
                                                
26 International Insolvency Institute Tenth Annual International Insolvency Conference Rome, Italy 
Coordination Of Multinational Corporate Group Insolvencies Enterprise Centre of Main Interests 
Principles – A Proposal Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, United States Bankruptcy Judge, June 7-8, 2010 
27 Robert van Galen, The revision of the EU insolvency regulation, briefing note p. 11 March 2011. 
Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies 
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When viewed in its best light, the situation is confusing. The reality however is that it 
creates a logistical and procedural nightmare, both from the administrative 
standpoint for the professionals administering the insolvency case, the court, and for 
the participants. The claims resolution process, which in a simple case is never 
simple, would become next to impossible with two concurrent cases. A creditor 
would have to file a claim with a specified priority in a territorial proceeding and 
another claim with possibly different priority in the main proceeding. Thereafter, the 
payment received in one case must be reconciled and offset against another 
payment received in the other case. Even if an insolvency administrator or court were 
able to undertake such a process, the administrative burden would render the task 
impossible. In cases where there are thousands of claims to be reconciled, this 
becomes a logistical nightmare. Without a common claims database between the 
concurrent cases, claims resolution becomes a logistical impossibility. Yet this is 
what is required under the Regulation. 
The claims resolution process is just one of many problems that arise when there are 
two concurrent insolvency cases. It is logical then, and indeed a well established 
tenant of EU law, and in other legal systems as well, that concurrent proceedings 
involving the same parties and same issues are to be avoided as a waste of judicial 
resources and in order to avoid conflicting judgments. For this reason, Article 27 of 
the Brussels I Regulation28 provides that as soon as a claim is initiated in one 
Member State, it has the automatic effect to preclude claims from being heard in 
another Member State. The Brussels I Regulation prevents the same case with the 
same parties being litigated at the same time, but this is allowed and indeed a 
central feature of the insolvency Regulation.  
The Regulation, before its final stages, did not allow dual concurrent proceedings. 
The 1980 Draft Convention “provided that for each insolvency only one court should 
have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus proceedings opened by a competent court would 
take effect with respect to all of the debtor's property”. Israel, p. 226 Due to the 
desire of Member States to preserve perceived advantages, territorial proceedings 
were created apparently as a political compromise rather than an intentionally 
designed mechanism. As such, the mechanism should be subject to a high level of 
scrutiny in its review. Further, and as seen next, it is in the context of concurrent 
proceedings that the procedural lacunae of the Regulation become most obvious and 
issues of due process, notice and fairness issues come to the forefront.  
3.6 The Regulation in action- how liquidators comply with the Regulation’s 
mandatory duty of cooperation 
The most revealing of the concurrent insolvency cases were the Eurofoods and 
Daisytek cases.29 In Eurofoods, both the Irish and Italian courts opened main 
insolvency proceedings for the Parmalat subsidiary Eurofoods. In Daisytek, both the 
English and French courts opened main insolvency cases. In the first of his two 
seminal articles, Judge Bufford goes into a detailed day by day analysis of the notice 
given by the Italian liquidator to the Irish liquidator, the court hearings, the notice 
and papers provided, and the opportunity to be heard or lack thereof. The most 
                                                
28 EC No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
29 12 Colum. J. Eur. L. 429, 473-4, Spring, 2006. International Insolvency Case Venue In The 
European Union: The Parmalat And Daisytek Controversies, Hon. Samuel L. Bufford,  
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striking aspect of the process is the last minute and inadequate notice given by the 
Italian liquidator to the Irish liquidator and Irish creditors and the failure of the 
Italian court to require adequate notice or provide a fair opportunity to be heard.  
Similarly for Daisytek, Judge Bufford reviews the complete lack of notice provided to 
French and German creditors of the first day hearings opening the proceedings and 
which resulted in the decision to open the cases in the UK. He similarly details the 
lack of notice given to English administrators or creditors of the hearings opening 
proceedings for other Daisytek entities before the French court. All these failures 
occur despite the specific notice and cooperation requirements in the Regulation.  
The facts lead to an inevitable conclusion. The solution proposed by Judge Bufford is 
simple yet compelling. On page 475 of the article, he proposes that the Regulation 
be supplemented with procedural rules to insure fairness and due process, and 
suggesting that the determination of whether a proceeding is a main or secondary 
proceeding, making the COMI determination, and all the critical factual 
determinations that encompass the COMI determination and jurisdiction, be subject 
to notice to the other administrators in pending proceedings in other countries, as 
well as creditors and other parties in interest. The suggestion that this critical 
hearing not be rushed though without anybody knowing about it, but rather, that it 
be set for a prompt hearing, makes sense.  
The Eurofoods Decision  
Shortly after publication of Judge Bufford's article, the European Court of Justice 
proposed a similar solution, only reaching into its own judicial tradition and rather 
than using the term “due process”, calling it “equality of arms”. The Court did not 
suggest a revision to the Regulation, which is beyond its scope as a Court, but it did 
send a clear message, a message that goes to the very heart of the Regulation. 
Simply put and as discussed in detail below, the Court held that absent compliance 
with procedural due process rules which are implicit in the Regulation, the key 
provisions of the Regulation do not apply. As we shall see in the text of the decision, 
the Court's directive is clear. 
Eurofoods is most often cited for its analysis of the COMI issue. But it is not until we 
get to the fifth and final of the preliminary questions raised in that case that we get 
to the question which is the focus of this paper.  
1. The fifth question 
Paragraph 60 of the opinion provides: “By its fifth question, the referring court 
essentially asks whether a Member State is required, under Article 17 of the 
Regulation, to recognise insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State 
where the decision opening those proceedings was handed down in disregard of 
procedural rules guaranteed in the first Member State by the requirements of its 
public policy.”30 
                                                
30 Article 17 provides that the opening of proceedings “shall, with no further formalities, produce the 
same effects in any other Member State as under the law of the State of the opening of proceedings..”  
As quoted by the ECJ,  “Article 26 provides that a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency 
proceedings opened in another Member State where the effects of such recognition would be 
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The actual text of the fifth question as quoted in the AG opinion is more detailed 
and provides as follows:  
5) Where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of a Member State to 
permit a judicial or administrative decision to have legal effect in relation [to] 
persons or bodies whose right to fair procedures and a fair hearing has not 
been respected in reaching such a decision, is that Member State bound, by 
virtue of Article 17 of the said regulation, to give recognition to a decision of 
the courts of another Member State purporting to open insolvency 
proceedings in respect of a company, in a situation where the court of the 
first Member State is satisfied that the decision in question has been made in 
disregard of those principles and, in particular, where the applicant in the 
second Member State has refused, in spite of requests and contrary to the 
order of the court of the second Member State, to provide the provisional 
liquidator of the company, duly appointed in accordance with the law of the 
first Member State, with any copy of the essential papers grounding the 
application? 
The Court then reasons as follows: First, it refers to the Krombach case [Case C-7/98 
2000], in which the Court held that Article 27 of the Brussels Convention, which 
allows recourse to the public policy exception to the free movement of judgments, is 
to be used only in “exceptional cases”, and one such case would be when 
enforcement of the judgment would infringe on a fundamental principle which would 
breach a rule of law essential to the legal order of a state. In applying that standard 
to Article 26, to thereby allow one member state to refuse to recognize insolvency 
proceedings opened in another state, the Court in par. 65 first refers to “the general 
principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process”, which is 
itself inspired by “the fundamental rights which form an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law which the Court of Justice enforces, drawing inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the 
guidelines supplied, in particular, by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ...” In par. 65, therefore, the Court 
reiterates that due process rights form part of the general principles of Community 
law, which are superior to secondary law, including, specifically, the Insolvency 
Regulation itself. 
Par. 66 of the opinion is a key paragraph in that it further develops the right to fair 
legal process of par. 65 and describes further more specific rights:  
• The right to be notified of procedural documents;  
• The right to be heard;  
• “In the context of insolvency proceedings, the right of creditors or their 
representatives to participate in accordance with the equality of arms 
principle is of particular importance.” Further, any restriction on the right to 
be heard “must be duly justified and surrounded by procedural guarantees 
ensuring that persons concerned by such proceedings actually have the 
opportunity to challenge the measures adopted in urgency.” 
                                                                                                                                       
manifestly contrary to that State's public policy, in particular its fundamental principles or the 
constitutional rights and liberties of the individual.” Eurofoods, par. 61 
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Based on these rights, the Court concludes in paragraph 67, that, based on Article 
26, a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in 
another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in 
flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be heard, which a person concerned by 
such proceedings enjoys.” 
The impact of the rights enumerated in these paragraphs of the Eurofoods opinion 
cannot be overstated. It is nothing less than a “Bill of Rights” in the insolvency 
context. A failure to comply negates the fundamental mechanism of the Regulation, 
i.e. the mandatory recognition of the effect of the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. The statement of these rights, however, goes beyond merely negating 
the effect of the Regulation, for it establishes rights that are not limited to 
recognition of proceedings, but which must be observed in all aspects of insolvency 
regulation. This is evident in the way the ECJ presents its analysis, first establishing 
these fundamental rights in the insolvency context in general, and only then 
applying them to the specific question of recognition.  
2. The AG Opinion  
The AG opinion is consistent with the foregoing conclusion that these are generally 
applicable fundamental rights based on general principles of Union law which are 
then applied to the specific question. The AG opinion then further explains these 
rights. In paragraph 143 of the AG opinion, he cites the “essential procedural 
guarantees” of “opportunity to be heard”, and “rights of participation in the 
proceedings”: 
“Public policy does not involve a general control of the correctness of the procedure 
followed in another Contracting State, but rather of essential procedural guarantees 
such as the adequate opportunity to be heard and the rights of participation in the 
proceedings. Creditors whose participation is hindered are expressly mentioned.” 
[citing the Virgos-Schmit Report] 
In par. 145 of the opinion, the AG again refers to the rights of “due process”, “right 
to be heard” and “rights of participation in the proceedings”: “The public policy 
referred to in Article 26 of the Regulation thus in my view clearly does encompass 
failures to observe due process where essential procedural guarantees such as the 
right to be heard and the rights of participation in the proceedings have not been 
adequately protected.” 
3. Equality of Arms 
Paragraph 66 of the ECJ opinion refers to equality of arms: “In the context of 
insolvency proceedings, the right of creditors or their representatives to participate 
in accordance with the equality of arms principle is of particular importance.” 
Interestingly, however, the AG opinion doesn’t use “equality of arms” to explain the 
right to participate. What does equality of arms mean and why was this chosen as 
the language to describe the specific right of creditors to participate in insolvency 
proceedings? What does this add to the explicit statement of rights already 
articulated in the ECJ and AG opinions?  
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In an insightful and in depth analysis in his 2007 article,31 Judge Bufford ties the 
equality of arms principle to the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European 
Charter of Human Rights, and specifically in the insolvency context, that the “the 
principle requires that each party in interest in an insolvency case be given a full and 
fair opportunity to present both the fact and the law on its side, and equally, that it 
be given a full and fair opportunity to comment on the evidence and legal arguments 
of the opponent.” [p. 398-9]  
On a practical level and more specifically, in the context of the opening of an 
insolvency procedure, it requires, first, that reasonable advance notice be given of 
the initial opening matters to the major unsecured creditors, affected secured 
creditors and supervisory governmental authorities. Second, equality of arms 
requires that any orders issued at such initial hearing must be temporary and limited 
to what the debtor needs to operate or preserve the estate in the first few weeks of 
the case. Judge Bufford points out that these rights under the principle of equality of 
arms were denied in the Eurofoods case because simply, the Italian liquidator would 
not provide copies of relevant court documents for an upcoming hearing to the Irish 
liquidator, and the Irish liquidator was not given a reasonable amount of time to 
submit documents to the Italian court.  
4. Conclusion- the Regulation is self-defeating because it fails to incorporate the 
procedural rules necessary for its own operation 
Whether the term equality of arms is used, as in the ECJ opinion, or the term due 
process, as in the AG opinion, the fundamental principles and direction from the ECJ 
is clear. The Regulation does not and cannot function without adherence to the 
rights outlined, including the right to advance notice, the right to be heard, the right 
to participate in the proceedings, the right to receive documents in advance, with 
such rights being granted to all affected parties to the insolvency. It is essentially an 
insolvency bill of rights, consistent with general principles of Union law, and superior 
to all secondary law.  
When these rights are violated, the ECJ has ruled that the fundamental provision of 
the Regulation, the mandatory recognition of the opening of an insolvency 
proceeding by a Member State, becomes nullified. Thus, the Regulation is essentially 
self-defeating because it fails to incorporate the procedural rules necessary for its 
own operation. This is a clear statement and directive from the ECJ, a clear message 
that procedural rules and due process mechanisms must be provided at the Union 
level to fix the Regulation. That is what this paper proposes in the following 
sections, specifically, a minimal set of procedural rules consistent with the structure 
suggested by Spencer, along with a proposal for the modification and 
implementation of the already existing interconnected insolvency database. 
 
                                                
31 27 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 351, Winter 2007, The Honorable 
Samuel L. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of 
Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the European Court of Justice 
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4 The Existing Notice Provisions of the Regulation 
Before proposing specific measures to comply with the direction from the ECJ, it is 
instructive to review the rules that are already in the Regulation and their adequacy 
in light of the due process rights enumerated in Eurofoods. An analysis 
demonstrates that the Regulation directs three distinct levels of notice and 
information sharing: (1) specifically identified information which must be provided; 
(2) non specified, generally described information which must be provided; (3) other 
information which may optionally be provided.  
Surprisingly, the only information which is specifically identified and which is 
required to be provided relates to the notice of opening of the proceedings. Article 
40 requires that notice of opening of proceedings must be given to creditors in other 
Member States:  
Article 40- Duty to inform creditors 
1. As soon as insolvency proceedings are opened in a Member State, the court 
of that State having jurisdiction or the liquidator appointed by it shall 
immediately inform known creditors who have their habitual residences, 
domiciles or registered offices in the other Member States.  
2. That information, provided by an individual notice, shall in particular 
include time limits, the penalties laid down in regard to those time limits, the 
body or authority empowered to accept the lodgement of claims and the 
other measures laid down. Such notice shall also indicate whether creditors 
whose claims are preferential or secured in rem need lodge their claims. 
Presumably, notice to domestic creditors is covered under national law. The 
Regulation does not require that notice to domestic creditors comply with any 
minimum standards. Par. 1 requires notice of opening of the proceedings be 
provided to creditors in other Member States. . This does not allow creditors to 
participate in the hearing regarding the determination of COMI or any other 
proceedings which occur in the first couple of weeks of the case. As discussed 
above, the determination of COMI is subject to various legal criteria and evidentiary 
showing. Further, it is outcome determinative, establishing the applicable law, and is 
not subject to later review. Prior notice and opportunity to be heard in these matters 
is critical, and under the Eurofood standards, failure to provide notice and 
opportunity of creditors and parties to participate would allow a court in another 
member state to refuse to recognize the proceedings. 
The notice procedure set forth in paragraph 1 omits the details necessary for 
providing notice. Practically, how is the court or liquidator supposed to immediately 
provide notice to all creditors with registered offices, domiciles or residences in 
other states? Is the insolvent company required to maintain and immediately provide 
a list of foreign creditors? Does each national law require that such a list be in a 
format that can easily be used by a court or liquidator to send out thousands of 
notices? What if the books and records of the company are not complete and up to 
date, which is more common than not for distressed businesses? If the court or 
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liquidator simply uses the accounts payable ledger of the company, it will likely 
exclude non-trade creditors such as a landlord, equipment lessor, secured creditor, 
or disputed creditors. Does the court have the necessary administrative capability to 
sort through these issues in order to provide “immediate” notice? In short, the 
mandatory notice requirement of Regulation, in the absence of sufficient procedural 
rules, is illusory. 
Par. 2 refers to notice of time limits and procedures regarding the filing of claims. In 
that regard, it is similarly inadequate. Further, the Regulation does not include the 
requirement to provide notice to creditors of specific procedural matters in the 
administration of the case that may affect them directly, such as requests for 
approval of the disposition of assets, settlement of controversies, or other 
significant matters in the case. 
A second category of mandatory notice relates to information which the Regulation 
requires to be provided, but which is described only in general terms. Recital 20 
requires that liquidators share current information in order to coordinate concurrent 
proceedings: 
“Recital (20) - Main insolvency proceedings and secondary proceedings can, however, 
contribute to the effective realisation of the total assets only if all the concurrent 
proceedings pending are coordinated. The main condition here is that the various 
liquidators must cooperate closely, in particular by exchanging a sufficient amount 
of information.” 
Similarly, Article 31 contains a mandatory requirement for liquidators in main and 
secondary proceedings to “communicate information” to each other which “may be 
relevant”. It further requires that a liquidator in secondary proceedings give the 
liquidator in the main proceedings “an early opportunity of submitting proposals on 
the liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings.”  
First, these two provisions require sharing of information only between liquidators, 
and not with the court, creditors or other interested parties. One commentator has 
pointed out that Article 31 does not require courts to cooperate with each other, 
only liquidators, and that a general duty of courts to cooperate cannot be deduced 
from community law.32 
These two provisions of the Regulation require that the proceedings be coordinated 
between liquidators, not that notice sufficient for meaningful participation by parties 
needs to be provided. Even as a coordination mechanism, however, the provisions 
fail miserably. They are unacceptably vague, requiring the sharing of “a sufficient 
amount of information”. It might be assumed that the vagueness is because the 
drafters expected that the details be dealt with under applicable national law, 
however it is unreasonable to expect that a cross border insolvency information 
sharing protocol between liquidators would be covered in any national insolvency 
law. Alternatively, the drafters may have expected that liquidators would be mutually 
reasonable and cooperative. The case law has proved otherwise. 
                                                
32 Heinz Vallender, Judicial cooperation within the EC Insolvency Regulation. Available at 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/WebPortal_en/projects/ieei/documents/public_papers/judicial_cooperation.pd
f 
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Although the duty to communicate relevant information specified in Article 31 is 
mandatory, the vagueness of the requirement effectively renders it optional. The 
Eurofoods case is an example of how likely information sharing is to occur in the real 
world. Aside from the political or other reasons why liquidators may not be inclined 
to share information, even if the inclination was present, from a practical standpoint, 
a tremendous amount of ongoing real time information exchange and coordination 
is required in order to coordinate two or more concurrent insolvency proceedings 
involving the same assets, claims and creditors. The provision needs an explicit list 
of documents that must be provided. 
As for providing information necessary for parties in interest, including the other 
liquidators and creditors, this provision fails under the standards of the ECJ. The 
March 2011 follow-up study to the Harmonization Report identifies 13 different 
classes of stakeholders in an insolvency case.33 All stakeholders need notice. Notice 
provisions need to be explicit, based on explicit procedural rules. The Regulation 
should provide that the information provided to the Court and the other liquidator, 
and which should be available to all such stakeholders, should include but not be 
limited to the following: a copy of all filings in the case, including advance notice of 
all court hearings; copies of motions and requests to the court; any court rulings; 
notice of meetings of creditors; notice of sale or other disposition of property; notice 
of proposed settlement of litigation or disputes; and notices of requests for 
compensation from insolvency professionals paid from the assets of the debtor. 
Additionally, the court, the other liquidators, governmental regulatory agencies, and 
major creditors and any creditors committee should receive additional information 
beyond that given to general unsecured creditors, including regular financial reports, 
a monthly statement of assets and liabilities, a list of all expenditures and income 
during the relevant period, and the payment and/or accrual of administrative 
expenses and professional fees.  
Liquidators, or debtors, or whomever is operating or liquidating the business, need 
to be given clear direction about providing information necessary for the meaningful 
participation by other parties in the proceeding. It is not a matter for national law 
because it involves concurrent proceedings in two or more member states. The 
Regulation requires a clear statement of what information needs to be provided, 
when and by whom.  
In summary, the Regulation itself acknowledges that this unique system, where 
universalism and territoriality co-exist, can work “only if” information is shared: 
20) Main insolvency proceedings and secondary proceedings can, however, 
contribute to the effective realisation of the total assets only if all the 
concurrent proceedings pending are coordinated. The main condition here is 
that the various liquidators must cooperate closely, in particular by 
exchanging a sufficient amount of information. 
                                                
33 Harmonisation of insolvency at EU level: avoidance actions and rules on contracts, March 2011, p. 
5. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=es&file=35211   
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Yet, the Regulation does not implement that sharing of information. Sections V and 
VI below present a mechanism for accomplishing this objective, primarily through a 
unified EU insolvency register. .  
4.1 Notice and logistical issues in distribution of proceeds in concurrent 
proceedings 
The above discussion about providing information for coordination between 
liquidators and providing basic information to creditors and other parties is the 
simple part. The real hard part is what happens when liquidators, courts or 
insolvency administrators have to figure out how to actually pay the creditors. Recital 
21 provides in pertinent part that: “the distribution of proceeds must be coordinated. 
Every creditor should be able to keep what he has received in the course of 
insolvency proceedings but should be entitled only to participate in the distribution 
of total assets in other proceedings if creditors with the same standing have 
obtained the same proportion of their claims.” 
Article 32, par. 2, requires that “liquidators in the main and any secondary 
proceedings shall lodge in other proceedings claims which have already been lodged 
in the proceedings for which they were appointed.” 
A creditor is entitled to file a claim in both the main and territorial proceedings. The 
recital requires that the distribution of proceeds be coordinated in order to insure 
the creditors of equal priority receive the same percentage distribution. The only 
direction provided by the Regulation is that the “distribution of proceeds must be 
coordinated.”  
Since this is a cross border insolvency issue, there is no national law that provides 
the procedural rules for this process. This however is a huge logistical undertaking 
requiring the sharing of large amounts of information between concurrent 
insolvency proceedings in two or more different member states. This requires that 
the liquidator or administrator or court, depending on which party administers 
payments to creditors under the law of the member state, must provide a complete 
list of all claims filed, with name of the creditor including the names of related 
entities which also may have filed claims for the same debt, with the analysis of the 
validity of the claim, the percentage payout received, an analysis of the priority of 
the claim, and a reconciliation of each claim in each proceeding.  
Further, creditors often file multiple and/or duplicative claims, or claims may already 
have been filed by a related entity for the same debt.. Therefore, a copy of the claim 
and attached backup information needs to be provided and needs to be reviewed 
and compared and reconciled with the other claims. Moreover, in the event of two or 
more concurrent cases, two of more sets of national laws must be applied to the 
same claim for the same company in the different cases, with potentially two or 
more different judicial determinations as to the validity of the claims. Finally, all of 
the claims resolution proceedings would have to be noticed to the related parties in 
the other pending cases.  
Once the claims themselves are reconciled, the payments need to be equalized 
among the various concurrent proceedings to ensure that a creditor who files in one 
proceeding is not paid less than a creditor who files in two or more proceedings. In 
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addition, during this process, all relevant documents need to be provided to the 
creditor whose claim is being reconciled and equalized. Again, it is a logistical and 
procedural nightmare and the Regulation does not provide any guidance or 
procedure, nor is it available under national law.  
A third category of information is that which the Regulation recommends be shared, 
but does not make such sharing mandatory. Per Article 21, the publication of notice 
of the judgment opening insolvency proceedings, whether a main proceeding, or 
secondary proceedings, is optional under the Regulation: “The liquidator may 
request that notice of the judgment opening insolvency proceedings and, where 
appropriate, the decision appointing him, be published in any other Member State in 
accordance with the publication procedures provided for in that State.” (emphasis 
added) “However, any Member State within the territory of which the debtor has an 
establishment may require mandatory publication.” Recital 29 provides that notice of 
the opening of proceedings “should” be published.  
Article 40, discussed above, imposes the mandatory requirement that the liquidator 
provide individual notice to known creditors in other member states. Presumably, 
national law requires notice to domestic creditors. With actual notice of the opening 
of the proceedings being provided to all known creditors, it must be assumed that 
the purpose of this optional publication requirement is to provide notice to unknown 
creditors, such as those that may not have been listed in the records of the debtor as 
creditors. This may occur for any number of reasons, for example, the debtor's 
accounting is not current, or there may be a dispute as to the balance, or the claim 
itself is disputed by the debtor, or the claim arises from a tort claim. The concern 
regarding unknown creditors is well placed, however the mechanism to provide 
notice is outdated and incomplete.  
First, as mentioned above, the use of a debtor's accounts receivable ledger as a list 
of creditors will omit a large number of creditor claims such as non vendor type 
claims, lease claims or disputed contingent or unliquidated claims. These types of 
claims should be required to be disclosed in the initial filing papers opening the case 
as part of a set of minimum procedural harmonization rules. This would reduce the 
number of claims which otherwise would be omitted from the list of creditors used 
to provide notice.34 
Second, assuming that there are unknown claims that have not been listed, the use 
of publication notice is outdated and ineffective and neither reflects the currently 
available technology for providing information nor provides adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard under the Eurofoods standard. Rather, this is one of the 
circumstances where an efficient and accessible insolvency register is needed in 
order to post critical and timely information about the proceedings. This will be 
discussed in the following section.  
                                                
34 A list of minimum procedural harmonization rules consistent with the Spencer model and the bill of 
insolvency rights set forth by the ECJ is the subject of a future study by the author. 
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5 The Insolvency Database 
When one considers the Regulation in actual use, the practical complexities can be 
overwhelming. The exercise of universal jurisdiction in the case of an operating 
business or even liquidation is not a simple matter. It requires immediate freezing of 
lawsuits or other attempts by creditors to collect pre-filing debts and enforcement 
procedures to prevent such attempts. All these require universal real time notice to 
courts, creditors and numerous other parties. When a main proceeding with 
universal jurisdiction is then modified by subsequent secondary proceedings which 
create a carve-out from universality, the ensuing complexities require further 
immediate notice to additional parties in several countries.  
How is this combination of universal and territorial jurisdiction supposed to work 
without full and immediate notice? And how are parties able to exercise their right to 
create an exception to universal jurisdiction if they don’t have immediate access to 
the information necessary to make the determination of whether to file a secondary 
proceeding? For example, in the recent Probud case, a German creditor seeking to 
recover an asset located in Germany but subject to a main Polish insolvency 
proceedings failed to file a secondary case which would have preserved the asset in 
Germany for the German creditors.35  
These and other logistical complexities demand adequate real time information flow. 
The Regulation, however, was conceived and implemented before the technological 
tools needed to effectuate its operation existed. Nor were there provisions for notice 
in the Regulation sufficient to meet the fundamental standards articulated by the 
ECJ. The technological issues, procedural issues and substantive issues of the 
Regulation are inextricably intertwined and mutually dependent. Now is the time to 
reconsider them in light of current realities. 
5.1 The calls for an insolvency database 
The calls for an effective centralized EU insolvency database have been many. Monti 
mentions the insolvency regulation as part of the section titled “Facilitating the 
solution of cross-border of (sic) commercial and civil law disputes” 36:  
“In the context of the current crisis, the possibility of reviewing the regulation on 
cross-border insolvency should be examined. More efficient and faster insolvency 
proceedings - notably when cross-border groups of companies are involved - would 
be in the interest of both debtors and creditors. Enhancing administrative 
cooperation through the support of the E-justice portal could also bring practical 
benefits in the short term.” 
Further, the Harmonization Report notes the “need for an EU database of court 
orders and judgments” and also notes that “cost effective administration is hindered 
by the absence of an EU database containing relevant court orders and judgments.” 
                                                
35 MG Probud Gdynia, C-444/07 2010.  
36 A New Strategy For The Single Market At The Service Of Europe's Economy And Society, Report 
to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso by Mario Monti, 9 May 2010, page 
40; http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf 
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Nora Wouters, one of the authors of the Harmonization Report, in the Insolvency 
Harmonization Workshop held at the Parliament on March 22, 2011, reiterated the 
need of central database containing all insolvency judgments so that creditors would 
know where and when to file claims. 
The Council supports the creation and use of an interconnected insolvency register 
and expounds on some potential uses:  
The use of new technologies has proved indispensable for modern life and in the 
field of Justice it can benefit the economy in many ways. Therefore, the Council: 
(b) indicates that one possible use of these new technologies would be to 
interconnect business registers and/or insolvency registers which exist in the 
Member States so as to ensure easy access to the data contained therein. 
This could help, for instance, potential buyers of an insolvent company, thus 
permitting the acquiring company to expand its market and enabling the 
company being purchased to avoid bankruptcy and save the jobs of its 
employees. In the process of interconnection, data protection rules should be 
respected.37 
To date however, there have been no comprehensive statements of what information 
an insolvency database requires, how it needs to be designed for effective use, or 
how it could be used to satisfy the due process requirements articulated by the ECJ. 
Yet the database is the single most important and critical tool for providing 
information necessary for the exercise of basic due process rights to courts, 
creditors and other parties. An insolvency database may sound like a mere technical 
exercise, but it goes to the very fundamental issues of due process, right to notice, 
right to information, and the right to participate in insolvency proceedings as 
addressed in the Eurofoods decision.  
5.2 What insolvency databases are operational at this time?  
1. Insolvency registers via the e justice portal38 
The interconnection of existing national insolvency registers is part of the overall E-
Justice Action Plan adopted by the Council in 2009.39 The system provides for the 
interconnection of criminal records, land records, insolvency registers, company 
                                                
37 Draft Council Conclusions on Economic Crisis Prevention and Support for Economic Activity, 
March 29, 2010, document no. 7881/10; 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st07/st07881.en10.pdf 
See also Green Paper on: The interconnection of business registers 15801/09, 4.11.2009; highlighting 
the need for information access for the operation of the single market in the cross border context; 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15801.en09.pdf 
38 Information about the current state of the process of interconnection of insolvency databases is from 
publicly available information on the internet. The author thanks Margaret Tuite, Deputy Head of Unit, 
Criminal Law, European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice; and Marc van Opijnen, Senior 
Adviser Legal Informatics, Department for Internet Applications of the Dutch Council for the 
Judiciary, Utrecht, for taking the time to explain how the systems operate. 
39 Multi-Annual European E-Justice Action Plan 2009-2013 
(2009/C 75/01)Official Journal of the European Union C 75/1 dated 31.1.2009 
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registers and other electronic records. Access to the E Justice System is through the 
E-Justice Portal.40 The portal is a work in progress.41  
The interconnected insolvency register is not a comprehensive or complete 
database, but a series of separate national registers. Each national register is 
maintained solely by each member state. Via the Portal, a user will be able to utilize 
a single search page to search all the registers and provide translated results. The 
project however does not contemplate any standardization of the separate national 
databases, nor does it require any minimum standard of information. Further, it 
does not mandate member states to maintain a register at all. The project is still in 
the formative stage and is not expected to “go live” for some time.  
2. The current national insolvency registers in practice 
Separate insolvency register information is currently available through an E-justice 
search page which in turn provides a link to the insolvency register information for 
each of the participating member states.42 Clinking on the links, however, produces 
varying results and indicates that many states do not have working insolvency 
registers. Clicking on each state on the site leads to the following results: 
• Belgium: no insolvency register 
• Bulgaria: no insolvency register, but list of trustees and sales and auctions is 
available 
• Czech Republic: searchable insolvency register, in Czech language only 
• Denmark: no insolvency register 
• Estonia: Commercial register includes list of bankruptcies, in Estonian only; 
additionally, official electronic publication Ametlikud Teadaanded has 
searchable list of bankruptcies in Estonian 
• Ireland: non-electronic insolvency register in Dublin available for in person 
searches only 
• Greece: Greece has no website for insolvency registers. “We are in the 
process of designing the digitisation of our databases and their electronic 
interface.” 
                                                
40 “The European e-Justice Portal, which was launched in July 2010, makes it easier to find information 
about legal issues and to work on legal matters. The launch of the portal is a first step towards a well-
developed, multilingual portal that will make things easier for individual citizens, businesses and legal 
practitioners in the EU.”  http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2710/a/151335 
41 See for example, Memo on the status of implementation of the European e-Justice action plan, which 
provides that, “With reference to the interconnection of insolvency registers, it provides, inter alia, for 
the continuing integration of data from the insolvency registers of Member States, the creation of a 
multi-lingual user interface and glossary of terms.” 9714/1/10 REV 1, Brussels, 21 May 2010; 
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09/st09714-re01.en10.pdf 
See also memo from The Informal Group on Interconnection of Insolvency Registers to: Working 
Group on e-Law (e-Justice), Report on Insolvency Registers Brussels, 23 July 2010; 11487/10.  This 
memo deals with the status of the technical aspects of the interconnection process.  
42 https://e-
justice.europa.eu/contentPresentation.do?lang=en&idTaxonomy=110&idCountry=EU&vmac=L5GUT
Y_fcRJzjYetP_mx9VxsHw82eaE2Eg0pUSLi-
VlKpYi32QJdQ_RbagESKM5ajn0ylN_9fP7k45eNksn25AAADmgAAALi 
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• Spain: “In Spain, the Registro Público Concursal (Public Insolvency Register) 
was created by Royal Decree Law No 3/2009 and will replace the current 
Registro Público de Resoluciones Concursales (Public Register of Insolvency 
Rulings). The Public Insolvency Register will publish the rulings in insolvency 
proceedings. It will be an administrative, public and free register and will be 
operational in 2010.” 
• France: no insolvency register. 
• Italy: “The Italian Ministry of Justice is setting up a new electronic system to 
manage data related to insolvencies.” 
• Cyprus: no online insolvency register. 
• Latvia: on line searchable insolvency register in Latvian. 
• Lithuania: no separate insolvency register, but “You can check the status of 
companies in this respect on the website of the Register of Legal entities.”  
• Luxembourg: no insolvency register. 
• Hungary: online information about in solvency proceedings in the Business 
Register and Company Gazette in Hungarian. 
• Malta: no insolvency register. 
• Netherlands: online searchable Central Insolvency Register in Dutch. 
• Austria: online searchable insolvency register in German. 
• Poland: online insolvency register, link broken (last searched on Feb. 24, 
2011). 
• Portugal: online insolvency register in Portuguese. 
• Romania: “the Insolvency Proceedings Bulletin (IPB) published by the National 
Trade Register Office registers summons, communications, convening 
notices, notifications of procedural documents issued by courts and by 
judicial administrators/liquidators performed in the frame of insolvency 
proceedings in accordance with Law no. 85/2006 on insolvency proceedings.” 
The site highly detailed English instructions and, along with the Slovenian 
register, is the most developed of all the countries. However, after the 
informational page, the website is in Romanian. 
• Slovenia: This register has a very detained on line searchable insolvency 
database with a detailed English description, but after the informational 
page, the website is in Slovenian. It contains very detailed and useful 
information including all court insolvency orders, notices of initiation of 
insolvency proceedings, notice of hearings, all minutes of hearings and 
meetings of creditors' committees, administrator’s reports, lists of claims, 
and notices of auctions and other disposition of assets. 
• Slovakia: “The Slovak insolvency register contains information on bankruptcy 
decrees and is owned and maintained by the Ministry of Justice of Slovakia. 
However, the data contained on the register has not been made public as the 
register currently remains at a pilot stage.”  
• Finland: requests for insolvency information must be made to the Finnish 
Legal Register Center and are charged 10 euro per abstract. 
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• Sweden: “Information contained in The Insolvency Register of Sweden is 
available free of charge by contacting the Swedish Companies Registration 
Office by phone. Requests for written information from the Register incur a 
fee in most cases.”  
• United Kingdom: separate searchable online insolvency registers for 
Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England and Wales. 
Despite the fact that some member states have operating online searchable 
insolvency databases, the current system is wholly inadequate. The language 
problem is an immediate barrier, but this is just one of the many problems, which 
include lack of information, no standardization of basic information, or, in some 
cases, the absence of a national requirement to register the opening of an insolvency 
proceeding.. Significantly, none of the national registers disclose the existence of a 
related main or secondary proceeding, which is the key item of information needed 
for the effective operation of the Regulation. This is a major flaw in the 
interconnection program.  
Nevertheless, the technology exists for an effective and accessible system, and other 
databases have been up and running for as long as a decade or more. These include 
advanced insolvency databases in certain Member States43 and the United States44, in 
addition to other EU databases such as the interconnected database used for VAT 
and the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register.45  
                                                
43 Norway has an advanced real time and accessible insolvency database.  Since March 2008, Norway's 
“Electronic Bankruptcy Estate Management” system has provided a detailed and comprehensive 
system which includes the following features: each estate is given its own website; the website allows 
for an electronic dialogue between the bankruptcy administrator and other parties, including creditors; 
information on the website is updated on a current basis as the bankruptcy case proceeds; and 
information is provided by and coordinated between various public agencies.  
44 PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) is a service which allows the public access to 
court records via the internet, including access to bankruptcy case and docket information, including 
copies of all documents filed by all parties in federal courts, which include the bankruptcy courts. 
Originally, all documents were digitized at a local court level, however, now many are electronically 
filed and so no digitization is required. All documents filed by all parties are available for viewing and 
downloading with minimal cost (8 cents a page).  
 Since the U.S. bankruptcy system is federal, there is one substantive and procedural statute for all 
bankruptcy courts in all states, although there are minor procedural variations between courts, i.e. local 
rules. The information required to file a bankruptcy case is standardized, hence, complete case and 
financial information is available. Pacer has been operational for over a decade and is operated by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, a federal agency. 
 The big question is if such a system or similar system is viable for the EU. Its primary 
characteristic is that it covers all federal courts, including bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy law in the 
United States is based on a single federal law throughout all fifty states, having a single insolvency law 
is not a prerequisite for such a system. Nor is it crucial at this point to have a complete set of all case 
documents available on line; rather, simply making certain basic information available is the first step, 
for example, the name and address of the insolvent company, the court where the proceeding was filed, 
the date of upcoming court hearings, and the name and contact information of the liquidator or 
attorney.  
 Further, it is not necessary to have a central infrastructure for PACER to operate. Even though 
PACER is centrally administered by a federal agency, according to the website, “Each court maintains 
its own databases with case information. Because PACER database systems are maintained within each 
court, each jurisdiction will have a different URL. Each court service is comparable to the others; 
however, the format and content of the information may differ slightly.”   
45 The commission currently operates several databases in connection with customs and taxation.  
These databases include SEED, the system for exchange of Excise Data, EXPORT, the system for 
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5.3 Moving forward step by step based on existing technology and due 
process requirements- A proposal for a three part due process package  
Minimal procedural harmonization-The Spencer Model applied 
As discussed above, the model proposed by Spencer is an overlay of basic 
procedural minimum standards along with a very low level of harmonization, not of 
the substantive national laws, but of procedural rules. In the cross border context, 
this becomes essential because, as discussed above, numerous procedural issues 
arise which are not addressed in national law. Spencer calls this “pragmatic 
harmonization” [page 47], i.e., the need for a uniform rule, regardless of whether 
one national rule is better than another, because of the pragmatic requirements of 
cross border transactions. His proposal was made in the criminal law context, 
specifically cross border crime, but it is equally relevant to insolvency proceedings.  
Spencer does not propose, however, to harmonize substantive law or even 
procedural rules, but instead “to superimpose on the national penal laws of the 
Member States a new single body of European rules, which would operate alongside 
the national ones.” In the criminal context, this proposal was made as the Corpus 
Juris project, which had three parts: first, to focus on and identify types of 
transnational financial fraud involving the EU budget, second, to create a uniform set 
of procedural rules which apply alongside national rules in certain cases only, and 
third to create a transnational agency, the European Public Prosecutor, to be in 
charge of investigation and prosecution. [pages 50-51] 
This Corpus Juris model is relevant and instructive to the insolvency area. First, both 
areas concern trans-national issues. Second, both areas require an overlay of 
common procedural rules. In the context of the Insolvency Regulation, these rules 
are needed in order to implement the Regulation and to fill in the obvious procedural 
gaps. Third, and as described below, an oversight agency at the EU level is critical as 
part of an overall package.  
Step 1: Guidelines for information to be included in the database  
The above analysis shows that the technology is available and the basic 
infrastructure has already been set up at the EU institutional level. There is a 
                                                                                                                                       
tracking of export goods, and VIES, the VAT Information Exchange System. The VIES system is a 
particularly relevant model for the interconnected insolvency database. The VIES system allows for the 
public to verify VAT identification numbers, using a web page established and maintained by the 
Commission, allowing the user to search a national VAT database. The Commission does not maintain 
the database, but merely provides a search portal thru which the national databases are accessible 
through an intranet. Although this is a true interconnected database, it is different from the insolvency 
database because there is no issue of language and the data is easily standardized. 
 There are also several other interconnected databases in various stages of development at the EU 
level, including the European Business Register (EBR), the Business Register Interoperability 
Throughout Europe (BRITE) project and the Internal Market Information System (IMI).   Among the 
most advanced of these databases is the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) , 
a harmonized and accessible database containing localized environmental data about industrial 
facilities throughout Europe and which is maintained by the European Environment Agency. 
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sufficient technological foundation on which to move forward. There are however, no 
guidelines on which to base a coherent, useful and standardized database content.46  
Standardized data guidelines must be tailored to requirements articulated by the ECJ 
in Eurofoods and to the actual need and usage of the database described above. 
They must then be communicated and coordinated with the technical aspects of the 
database. Moreover, the concurrent revision of the Regulation and the further 
development of the insolvency database not only need to be coordinated, but need 
to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken as a single endeavor. The status quo 
at the EU institutional level, in which the database and the Regulation are considered 
as separate undertakings, must be changed. 
Once the database becomes an efficient and accessible provider of basic insolvency 
information, it should be expanded to provide additional information and features in 
order to assist in the orderly and transparent administration of cross border 
insolvency proceedings.47 First, using the same technology commonly used on social 
websites, it should be expanded to allow interactive use, allowing attorneys and 
liquidators secured access in order to post current case information. For example, 
the posting of information related to the filing of a secondary or related case would 
avoid the Eurofoods scenario, in which liquidators in concurrent cases failed to share 
essential documents. Second, the database should add detailed claim information 
covering all stages of the claims filing and resolution process, including the claims 
form, instructions, applicable deadlines, a register of all filed claims and the status 
of the resolution process. Third, court documents and documents filed by all parties 
should be available on-line. This also becomes a possible method to make the 
project self funding by charging a small amount per page downloaded.  
Step 2: Insolvency institutions and infrastructure: the Creditors' Committee and 
Office of the European Insolvency Administrator  
The centralized EU insolvency register is the central part of a package, but it requires 
other structures and institutional support to work. Along with the minimum 
procedural rules and database mentioned above, a creditors’ committee model and 
an oversight agency is needed for a comprehensive due process regimen to 
accompany and implement the Regulation.  
1. The Creditors' Committee as a crucial due process mechanism in cross border 
cases 
Creditors' committees are not a new concept. They appear in various systems in 
Europe and are an integral part of Chapter 11 reorganization process in the United 
States. They already exist in some form in various continental proceedings both in 
France and in the German preliminary creditors’ committee (vorläufiger 
                                                
46 To the author's knowledge, there is no project to coordinate the existing database project with 
substantive insolvency issues. Plainly stated, nobody is telling the technical people what needs to go 
into the database. 
47 The information provided should meet the standards set articulated by the World Bank and 
UNCITRAL “Creditors Rights and Insolvency Standard” http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/FINAL-
ICRStandard-March2009.pdf 
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Gläubigerausschuss).48 Further, the World Bank and Uncitral recognize their value 
and encourage their use as a fundamental part of creditors' rights. 49  
A creditors' committee is a representative group of creditors formed in order to 
protect the interests of the creditor body as a whole. Acting both as a fiduciary for all 
creditors and as a creditor ombudsman, the committee participates in the 
proceedings through counsel, representing the common interests of all creditors, 
and insuring that due process rights are granted to all creditors, particularly those 
for whom it is neither practical nor economic to hire a lawyer. Typically, it is formed 
of a manageable group of seven to eleven creditors, i.e. representing various 
industries, geographical areas and types of claims.  
In light of complexities of concurrent cases across national boundaries, there is an 
even more compelling reason to incorporate this procedure into a set of minimally 
harmonized procedural rules. Despite several national laws about creditors' 
committees, the process differs extensively because of differing national procedures 
and does not incorporate provisions tailored to creditor protection in cross border 
cases. A minimal procedural harmonization in this regard would be consistent with 
the developing practices in Member States and would serve as a key element in 
insuring adequate notice and due process under the Regulation. A single committee, 
representing creditors in all the concurrent proceedings would serve as a crucial 
coordination mechanism, insuring that the claims distribution process did not result 
in discriminatory treatment between creditors in different jurisdictions, providing a 
real possibility of equal participation by all creditors, and ensuring compliance with 
the unique due process requirements that arise in concurrent cross border 
proceedings. 
2. A European Insolvency Oversight Agency as the coordinating and oversight body 
Along with the centralized insolvency register and creditors' committee, the third 
component of a comprehensive due process package is a European Insolvency 
Oversight agency, operating at the EU institutional level. This agency would serve to 
monitor the insolvency process and ensure the integrity and efficiency of cross 
border insolvency proceedings and the operation of the Regulation. Specific 
functions would include: 
1)  Oversight of liquidators and debtors in cross border proceedings to 
ensure compliance with due process and notice requirements, as well 
as establishment of standardized professional qualifications for 
liquidators and administrators; 
                                                
48 Clifford Chance, 29 October 2010 client briefing, Consultation Paper on First Step of Insolvency 
Reform; Available at 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2010/10/consultation_paperonfirststepof
insolvenc.html 
49 Creditor Rights And Insolvency Standard Revised 21 Dec 05, World Bank Revised Principles for 
Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
Original documents as of 21 December 2005 , page 25. 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/FINAL-ICRStandard-March2009.pdf 
See also UNCITRAL p. 197, containing well reasoned recommendations, albeit lacking specifics. 
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2)  Coordination with courts, liquidators, debtors, attorneys and 
committees regarding use of the insolvency database and oversight 
and monitoring of data input from the various parties; 
3) Administration of the committee formation process, i.e. appointing 
representative committees and arranging and supervising initial 
creditor meetings to ensure the integrity of the process and efficient 
operation of committees; 
4)  Coordination with technical database management personnel and 
Member States regarding content of the centralized database; 
5)  Interface with Member States insolvency administrative personnel; 
6)  Preparation of policy proposals and ongoing monitoring of the 
operation of the Regulation; 
7)  Ensuring coordination between various EU institutional parties 
working in the insolvency and E-justice areas in order to avoid 
ongoing fragmentation.  
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Conclusion 
This goal of this paper has been to present the context, the issues, and a proposed 
solution of discrete aspects of the European Insolvency Regulation. 
The context is dramatic. We are in the middle of the greatest financial crises since 
the Great Depression, in a Europe where the goal of the single market is paramount, 
and where the only legislation of cross-border insolvency consists of a short 
regulation that was negotiated starting in 1963 and which, because of its age, 
doesn’t deal with reorganizations, or multinationals or even one parent and its 
subsidiary together, but instead requires concurrent proceedings, multiple courts 
and the simultaneous application of widely varied and potentially conflicting laws.  
Faced with that context, there is a consensus that the Regulation needs extensive 
revision and that the upcoming review in June 2012 is the time to do so. What 
revisions should be done is the subject of much discussion and not the main focus 
of this paper, but most commentators agree that the COMI rules need to be revised 
to prevent cases flowing to the UK. There is consensus as well regarding the need to 
provide for groups of companies as well as for the reorganization of companies, not 
just their liquidation.  
This paper, however, has focused on needed revisions relating to due process rights, 
and specifically the rights of creditors and other interested parties to participate in 
insolvency proceedings in an informed and meaningful way. Significantly, the 
European Court of Justice has spoken clearly on this issue, pointing out that there is 
indeed a problem with due process in the Regulation, and that without due process, 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the Regulation does not and cannot 
function. 
Yet, we should not expect the ECJ to fix what is a legislative problem. The ECJ has 
provided the direction and the mandate; this paper is a response and provides a 
proposal to fix the legislative problem. That proposal consists of a three part due 
process package: (1) an accessible and efficient centralized EU insolvency register, 
(2) the formation of creditors' committees, and (3) the establishment of a European 
Insolvency Administrator.  
The centralized register, as the cornerstone of the due process package, must 
respond to the requirements articulated by the ECJ. It cannot be overemphasized 
that this is an issue where technology and law go hand in hand. The technology and 
infrastructure already exist and are in place at the EU institutions. The next step 
must be to provide the content. 
Finally, on the institutional level, this paper proposes that the concurrent revision of 
the Regulation and the development of the centralized register not only need to be 
coordinated, but need to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken, not as the 
separate efforts of diverse institutions, but as a single, unified endeavor. 
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